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ABSTRACT
Since the origination of the scientific study of voting behavior in the 1950s
and 1960s, political scientists have developed several models of voting behavior.
As those models were tested empirically, scholars were faced with a seeming
contradiction: while voters in general are poorly-informed about politics, they
nonetheless are capable of making voting decisions that are consistent with their
fully informed preferences.
Lodge, Stroh and Wahlke (1990) posited that none of these preexisting models
could adequately explain voter behavior, because they failed to explain the mech-
anisms that led to voters’ decisions. However, relatively few studies have been
done to understand how these mechanisms work, and the areas of research that
have attempted to explain these mechanisms have generally been seen as lacking
methodological rigor. In more recent years, scholars have looked at the use of
heuristics and affect as “cognitive shortcuts,” but have generally failed to provide
a compelling explanation of how and when voters can make use of them, beyond
demonstrating that they appear to do so.
In particular, relatively little attention has been paid to the question of which
heuristics are available to particular voters. While the use of heuristics is generally
considered to be an individual-level phenomenon, we should expect that various
groups of voters should process information in similar ways. In particular, it is
reasonable to believe that voters who are more aware of politics can draw upon
more sources of information when making evaluations, while less sophisticated
voters are more limited in their ability to draw inferences due to their lack of
vi
knowledge.
Thisdissertationdemonstrates howvotersmakeuseof political information and
heuristic devices in different ways based primarily on their their level of political
sophistication–their ability to comprehend and apply political information when
evaluating issues or making voting decisions.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
This dissertation is largely concerned with the importance of political sophistica-
tion—the degree to which citizens are knowledgeable about politics and capable
of making decisions that are consistent with their self interest.1 In particular, it
is concerned with how voters with varying levels of sophistication make political
decisions—how they decide to vote, how they evaluate issues, and how they judge
the performance of their current government. These are three key tasks that vot-
ers are expected to be able to perform, yet the overwhelming evidence from four
decades of scientific study of mass political behavior in the United States and other
countries suggest they are woefully unprepared for them, at least to the extent that
factual knowledge about politics is important.
However, many scholars believe that voters’ lack of factual knowledge can be
compensated for through other means—that citizens can act as if they are fully-
informed, despite failing to know everything they “need” to. These scholars argue
that various “shortcuts,” or heuristics, can be used by voters in lieu of complete
knowledge of politics and lead generally to decisions that are sufficiently similar to
thosemade by fully-informedvoters. On the other hand, there are other researchers
1Political sophistication, and similar concepts, are also known as political expertise, political
awareness, and civic competence. A thorough review of the use of the concept in political science
appears in Chapter 2.
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who argue that these shortcuts often lead voters to make incorrect decisions—
choices that are inconsistent with the decisions that would be made if citizens were
fully informed.
In the following chapters, I attempt to examine whether or not these heuristic
devices can adequately compensate for the general lack of knowledge and political
awareness in mass publics. Perhaps more importantly, I also consider whether
these devices are more useful among politically sophisticated voters than among
less informed members of the electorate. I also examine whether higher levels of
political sophistication are associated with greater understanding of the electoral
environment. In addition, I examinewhether the concept of political sophistication,
as developed in the American politics tradition, is generalizable to other contexts.2
The two chapters following this one review the existing literature and provide
the broad theoretical framework for this dissertation. Chapter 2 traces the evolu-
tion of the concept of political sophistication in political science and related fields,
including some of the evolutionary cul-de-sacs, from the initial understanding
of sophistication embodied in The American Voter (Campbell et al. 1960), through
more modern approaches drawing on psychological research and improved un-
derstanding of the survey response. Next, Chapter 3 reviews the literature on
the possibility that voters can use limited information to make political decisions,
primarily through the use of heuristics or cognitive shortcuts.
The next two chapters examine the use of potential heuristic devices by voters.
Chapter 4 examines whether voters can use their attitudes toward political figures
2While the generalization of sophisticationmay seem to be obvious, other apparently “universal”
political concepts developed in the American context have failed to have the samemeaning in other
contexts. The most obvious example is that of party identification (Budge, Crewe and Farlie 1976).
2
as a heuristic for deciding their stances on contemporary political issues. The
particular case considered is whether American voters interviewed for the 1994
National Election Study were able to evaluate the health care issue by using their
attitudes toward then-First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton, who was responsible
for the Clinton Administration’s national health care plan, as a heuristic for deriv-
ing their own personal attitudes toward the proposal. In particular, this chapter
examines the question of whether heuristic use is conditional on the voter’s level
of political knowledge, particularly when citizens attempt to formulate opinions
on more abstract issues, and finds that the use of attitudes toward the former
First Lady as a heuristic was largely confined to relatively sophisticated segments
of the public, suggesting that, in practice, heuristics fail to compensate for the
informational shortfalls of the public.
The next chapter examines the use of partisanship—attitudes toward political
parties—as a heuristic device by voters. Chapter 5 looks at the possibility that
voters use their underlying attitudes toward political parties to decide whether or
not those parties are governing effectively—in short, whether voters can properly
attribute blame or credit for government policies to the political parties responsible
for them. Specifically, this chapter examines how voters interviewed by the 1998
Dutch Parliamentary Election Study used their attitudes toward major political
parties—inside and outside the coalition government—to make evaluations of the
government’s performance, and how those performance evaluations affected their
voting decisions. As in the previous chapter, I examine whether the use of parti-
sanship as a heuristic is conditional on the voter’s level of political sophistication. I
also build onwork byDelli Carpini and Keeter (1996), demonstrating that a class of
latent variable models known as item-response theory models can be used to produce
3
valid measures of political sophistication where there is no observational measure
of the concept.
The final analytical chapter, Chapter 6, departs from the theme of heuristics
that underly the previous chapters. Instead, this chapter examines whether voters
engage in “conditional strategic voting”—choosing between sincere and strategic
voting on the basis of the anticipated closeness of elections—and whether this
behavior is more prevalent among more sophisticated voters. In this chapter, I
examine voting behavior in the 1992, 1996, and 2000 U.S. presidential elections,
and test whether voters were more likely to vote strategically—support a major-
party candidate instead of a minor-party candidate they might prefer—in states
where the presidential election was anticipated to be close; I also test whether or
not more sophisticated voters are more likely to vote strategically in these so-called
“battleground” states.
Finally, Chapter 7 reviews the findings of this dissertation, attempts to reach
some tentative conclusions about the effectiveness of cognitive shortcuts andwhether
or not they can adequately replace higher levels of political knowledge, and pro-
poses future avenues for research, including suggesting that political scientists
need to gain a better understanding of how people become more politically so-
phisticated and whether civic education—the remedy most often proposed in the
literature—is an effective tool for increasing sophistication over time.
This dissertation includes a number of contributions to our understanding of
political sophistication and its meaning in political science. One contribution is
improving our understanding of the effect of differential levels of sophistication
on the evaluative processes of voters and on their vote choices. Most of the extant
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literature has assumed that voters make evaluations and decisions in roughly the
same way regardless of their level of sophistication; by contrast, the models of
vote choice and opinionation presented in this dissertation allow the impact of key
explanatoryvariables tovarydependingon the respondent’s level of sophistication,
thus permitting us to consider how the differing resources and abilities of voters
affect the decisions that are made by voters.
As noted above, this dissertation also proposes the use of item-response theory
models, rather than additive or other ad hoc scales, as a measurement technique
when combiningmultiple items that are believed to be indicators of sophistication,
and demonstrates their use. Item-response theory models provide researchers
with indicators of the relative quality of each knowledge item, and may suggest
particular types of knowledge item that better measure sophistication than others.
These models have a number of benefits: they allow future survey designers to
concentrate on including items that are likely to be good indicatorswithout subject-
ing respondents to large batteries of knowledge questions, facilitate comparisons
between different potential indicators of sophistication, and can provide reliable,
objective measures of sophistication based on a limited number of items.
I also consider the universality of political sophistication; that is, whether polit-
ical sophistication is a meaningful concept outside the United States. While there
are good reasons to believe that sophistication has an important role in the decision-
making of voters worldwide, few scholars have examined this role to confirm its
apparent universality. By measuring, and testing the impact of, sophistication in a
very different electoral context than that found in the United States—a large, mul-
tiparty parliamentary system characterized by coalition governments with strong
religious and distributional cleavages—we can determine whether sophistication
5
is truly a universal concept, or if it is simply an artifact of the American political
system.
Finally, I considerwhether or not rational choice and psychological perspectives
on political sophistication can truly be reconciled, as some scholars have suggested
(see, for example, Lupia 2002 and Carmines and Huckfeldt 1996). While there
has been considerable consensus on the actual measurement of the concept of so-
phistication between these traditions, there remains a notable lack of consensus on
the substantive meaning of the concept: is sophistication a necessarily tautological
concept, as some political psychologists have seen it, or does it have a truly inde-
pendent effect on how people process and use political information? I hope to at
least provide a partial answer to that question in the subsequent chapters.
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CHAPTER II
THE CONCEPT OF POLITICAL SOPHISTICATION
Ever since the first studies of political behavior, political scientists have been aware
of vast differences between the level of political knowledge of the American public
and that expected in democratic theory. Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee (1954)
note:
The democratic citizen is expected to be well informed about political
affairs. He is supposed to know what the issues are, what their history
is, what the relevant facts are, what alternatives are proposed, what the
party stands for, what the likely consequences are. By such standards
the voter falls short (308).
From this statement about the lack of knowledge of citizens, a literature on
the concept of political sophistication (sometimes discussed using different termi-
nology) has evolved. This chapter examines that evolution, from its roots in The
American Voter (Campbell et al. 1960) and An Economic Theory of Democracy (Downs
1957) to its present usage. In particular, it examines the divergence in how dif-
ferent traditions within the discipline view the concept of political sophistication.
While Carmines and Huckfeldt (1996) note that “each of the three traditions [ra-
tional choice, sociological, and psychological approaches] has addressed a distinct
challenge to democratic theory” and that “they have also tended to converge on
a unified view of the citizen in democratic politics” (224), important differences
in perspective between these branches remain—including on the meaning of the
7
concept of sophistication.
2.1 The Levels of Conceptualization
Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes’s path-breaking study of the American
polity was the first to discuss the concept of political sophistication, although it did
not directly employ that term. Noting the vast range in the amount of knowledge
Americans have about politics, they attempted to classify the electorate into groups
based on the sophistication of individuals’ conceptualization of politics. They
described what they sought to measure as follows:
We are interested in the presence or absence of certain abstractions
that have to do with ideology; but we are also interested in the degree
to which an individual’s political world is differentiated, and, most
important, in the nature of the degree of “connectedness” between the
elements that are successfully discriminated. In short, we are interested
in the structure of thought that the individual applies to politics; and
this interest forces us to deal in typologies and qualitative differences
(221–22).
Subsequently, they established a typology of four levels of conceptualization
(identified as levels A–D), based on a reading of the responses to the open-ended
“likes anddislikes” questions they included in the 1956AmericanNational Election
Study.1 Level A consisted of “all respondents whose evaluations of the candidates
and the parties have any suggestion of the abstract conception one would associate
with ideology” and the three lower levels consisted of those expressing “fairly
1Since 1956, the presidential-year NES studies have included a series of open-ended questions
asking respondents to identify things they like and dislike about the two major parties and the two
parties’ presidential candidates; they have commonly been referred to as the “likes and dislikes”
questions since.
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Approximate percentage
Level Description of the 1956 electorate
A Ideologues and near-ideologues 11.5
B Group benefits (“ideology by proxy”) 42.0
C Nature of the times 24.0
D No issue content 22.5
Table 1: The levels of conceptualization in The American Voter
concrete and short-term group interest” or “ideology by proxy” (level B), attitudes
reflecting their perceptions of the state of the times (level C), and those whose atti-
tudes toward the two major parties and presidential candidates were unconnected
with domestic policy (level D) (222–23). The bulk of the sample fell into levels B–D,
with only about 11.5 percent showing some degree of ideological conception (level
A) (249). Campbell et al. also demonstrated that the higher levels of conceptual-
ization were associated with higher levels of education and political involvement.
The levels and their proportion of the 1956 electorate are summarized in Table 1,
reproduced from The American Voter.
Converse (1964) expanded on, and revised, the levels of conceptualization and
introduced the concept of a “belief system” to generalize the concept of ideol-
ogy used by Campbell et al.. He defined a belief system “as a configuration of
ideas and attitudes in which the elements are bound together by some form of
constraint or functional dependence” (207). Converse argues that the level of con-
straint in a person’s belief system is largely a function of the level of information
that individual possesses; by information, he means both simple facts and the
“contextual knowledge” or essential relationships between those facts (212–13).
He examined two different approaches to measuring the level of sophistication of
members of the public: the “active use” of ideology in making political decisions,
a recasting of Campbell et al.’s levels of conceptualization using the same “likes
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and dislikes” questions, and the recognition of the ideological positions of parties
and understanding of those ideological labels, based on the ability of a respondent
to characterize one of the parties as more conservative than the other and give a
reasonable explanation of what “conservative” meant. Converse noted that high
levels of sophistication according to both measures were associated with higher
levels of political activity and education, consistent with the findings of Campbell
et al..
Converse also considered sophistication in terms of the constraint of individ-
uals’ belief systems, and found relatively little constraint in the issue positions
expressed by the public when measured by the correlations among those issue
attitudes (227–29), suggesting again that much of the public had relatively un-
structured political belief systems. He held out the possibility of more constrained
belief systems within “issue publics”—subgroups with interests in particular is-
sue domains (245–46). Both conceptions of political sophistication advanced by
Converse—sophistication as ideological (or belief system) constraint and sophisti-
cation as the use, recognition, and understanding of ideology—would see further
development.
The conception of political sophistication in terms of the levels of conceptual-
ization continued to have some currency in the literature through the 1970s. Pierce
(1970), Pierce andHagner (1982) andNie, Verba and Petrocik (1976) used Campbell
et al.’s levels of conceptualization in various forms to illustrate the changing role of
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ideology in how voters made political decisions,2 arguing that voters had in gen-
eral increased their sophistication in the 1960s and 1970s. However, these works
were strongly criticized by Smith (1980), who presented evidence that the levels
of conceptualization measure had neither validity nor reliability.3 When Smith
examined both the Changing American Voter (Nie, Verba and Petrocik 1976) and
Pierce (1970) measures of the levels of conceptualization, as well as the original
measure used by Campbell et al. (1960), during the 1956–60 American National
Election Study panel using three different tests,4 he found that the reliability—and
hence the validity—of the measures was very low.5 Smith also argued that voters
in general were no more ideological or sophisticated than they were at the time of
The American Voter. More recent research appears to have abandoned attempts to
measure sophistication based on the levels of conceptualization per se.6
2Pierce (1970) and Pierce and Hagner (1982) used the interview transcripts to produce their
coding, while Nie, Verba and Petrocik (1976) used the set of “master codes” provided by the NES
in the public dataset to preserve anonymity.
3For a continuation of this debate, see Abramson (1981); Nie, Verba and Petrocik (1981); Smith
(1981); Cassel (1984); and Luskin (1987).
4 Smith used test-retest correlations (Kendall’s τ-b), a test of reliability in the presence ofmeasure-
ment error developed byWiley andWiley (1970), and attempting to explain changes in respondent
sophistication by changes in their interest in politics, political participation, and media use through
bivariate correlations.
5However, he later (Smith 1989: 22–42) reaches exactly the opposite conclusion based on the same
data—that the measures display a high level of individual-level stability, and hence are reliable.
However, he argues that they still lack validity, mainly because they fail to explain differences
in political attitudes and behavior that one would expect sophistication to affect (76–80). He
generally blames this lack of validity on the failure of Campbell et al. (1960) to tie the “levels of
conceptualization” to any extant psychological theory (81–82). Additional contributions of Smith
(1989) to the measurement of sophistication are discussed below.
6See, e.g., Miller and Shanks (1996), which mentions the levels of conceptualization only in
passing (567); however, see Bafumi (2003) for a recent application.
11
2.2 Constraint and Schematic Approaches
However, the second part of Converse’s work on belief systems—the idea of ide-
ological constraint indicating sophistication—continued to be studied. Jackson
and Marcus (1975) extended the ideological constraint to belief systems other than
liberalism and conservatism, and note:
The combined consequence of issues that generate low salience and
of issues that are couched in terms ambivalently or inconsequently
preferred by the public will be to yield low levels of ideological thinking
by the electorate. This would seem to place great importance on the
ability of political leadership to select and frame issues in ways that
encourage political analysis (107).7
This view of sophistication as constraint was subsequently revised and ex-
tended in terms of the schematic approach, which was taken up in the field of
political psychology. Fiske and Kinder (1981) made the first attempt to connect
the schema concept to political sophistication, noting the links between Converse
(1964)’s conception of ideology and the more general concept of a schema.8 They
suggest that there are numerous possible schemata that citizens can apply to pol-
itics, and suggest that citizens’ level of political involvement and expertise might
have an effect on what schemata are used (180–81), and conclude that that is the
case:
[S]chemaavailability and schemausedepend importantly on individual
differences—especially, we have argued, on expertise and involvement:
7Also see Carmines and Stimson (1980) who make a similar point in terms of the ability of
members of the public to engage in issue voting.
8Conover and Feldman (1984) provide a useful definition of a schema, derived from that of
Fiske and Linville (1980): “a cognitive structure of ‘organized prior knowledge, abstracted from
experience with specific instances’ that guides ‘the processing of new information and the retrieval
of stored information’ ” (96).
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The uninitiated do not have appropriate schemata available; novices
possess concrete versions of consensual schemata and use them in sim-
pleminded ways; and experts possess abstract schemata that they use
in sophisticated ways (187).
Converse’s finding that many voters did not use ideology for their political rea-
soning could thus be explained by heterogeneity in available schemata; for ex-
ample, voters might have other ways of making political decisions based on non-
ideological schemas based on such things as partisanship (Lodge andHamill 1986),
race and fundamental values of individualism and egalitarianism (Conover and
Feldman 1984). Explanation of how these schemata were formed, however, was
left to future research.
Like Fiske and Kinder, Conover and Feldman (1984) make an attempt to recast
the issue as a question of how people think about politics, given the substan-
tial evidence that most voters do not use ideology directly. The authors suggest
that a schematic approach provides a way to unify sociological and psychological
perspectives on the formation of belief systems (98–99). Like the pre-schematic
approach of Converse (1964), this approach conceptualizes sophistication as the
degree of association between various political beliefs; however, they indicate that
“people organize their political worlds in richer and more diverse ways than im-
plied by the traditional approaches to mass belief systems” (121), suggesting that
most people have a political belief system, and hence some degree of political
sophistication. However, their approach does not readily produce a measure of
individual sophistication; for example, would we consider some schemata more
“sophisticated” than others. Should we assume that more heterogeneity (or ho-
mogeneity!) in the schemata used by an individual would reflect greater sophis-
tication? A reading of Campbell et al. (1960) and Converse (1964) suggests that
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a hierarchy of schemata would be appropriate (with “ideology” being the most
sophisticated), while more consistent use of a single schema would be more so-
phisticated than the use of varying schemata; on the other hand, Fiske and Kinder
(1981) and Conover (1984) suggest that the use of multiple schemata reflects higher
sophistication than the use of a single schema for all political evaluations.
Hamill, Lodge and Blake (1985) defined a schema as a knowledge structure,
based onbothdeclarative (or factual) knowledge andknowledge of the associations
between concepts and facts, similar to Converse’s conception of information (852).
As in Fiske and Kinder (1981) and Conover (1984), Hamill, Lodge and Blake found
that voters with higher levels of expertise used more sophisticated and varied
schemata to evaluate issues, but even the less expert had some schemata they were
able to draw on.
The use of schemata in political psychology was strongly criticized by Kuklin-
ski, Luskin and Bolland (1991), who argued that schemas were being measured
inappropriately, their applications were merely “cosmetic,” and their use gener-
ally failed to give any additional insight than similar concepts such as cognitive
maps and attitudes. Perhaps more relevant to the issue of sophistication, however,
they noted the similarity between Hamill, Lodge and Blake’s measure of partisan
schema usage and measures of sophistication used elsewhere in the literature by
Zaller (1986) and Luskin (1987) (Kuklinski, Luskin and Bolland 1991: 1352, n.11),
suggesting that there were at least valuable insights that could be applied to future
research on sophistication from the “dead end” research program that they criti-
cize. While their critique was disputed at the time,9 the use of explicit schemata
9See, e.g. Lodge and McGraw (1991); Conover and Feldman (1991); and Miller (1991).
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in political science and political psychology has fallen out of favor, even if some of
the conceptual underpinnings remain in other work10 and the concept retains its
viability and validity in the related field of social cognition (see Fiske and Taylor
1991; Rhee and Cappella 1997). Moreover, one useful and enduring concept to
come out of this research line and political psychology’s forays into cognitive and
social psychology is that of “political expertise.”
2.3 Political Expertise and Political Sophistication
More recent works in the psychological vein have produced useful measures of so-
phistication, drawing on the more general concept of “expertise” used in cognitive
psychology. Fiske, Kinder and Larter (1983) suggest that political sophistication is
the result of acquiring knowledge about politics:
Experts have more chunks of knowledge, and the chunks themselves
containmore concepts (Chase& Simon, 1973). In addition, however, the
structure of knowledge apparently changes. As people become more
expert, their knowledge becomes more organized. . . . In any case,
the cohesion of organized knowledge seems to be greater in experts’
memory (384).
10For example, Lodge and McGraw (1995) note:
The associativenetworkmodel has come tobe adoptedbymanypolitical psychologists
. . . , and is clearly the structural “currency” of choice for most of the contributors to
this volume. So we forewarn readers who my find themselves wondering “where
is the schema?” that although the word itself is conspicuously absent from the text,
it is conceptually present throughout. . . . [W]e must underscore the point that
the concept of schema as an organized memory structure is still vitally important
to the understanding of political reasoning and judgment, but that specification of the
particular form such structuresmay take demandsmore precision than the ubiquitous
schema term provides (4).
Also, while Luskin (2002b) continues to reject schema theory as a whole, he suggests there might
be some promise in examining individual-level cognitive mappings like those presented in Lodge
and McGraw (1991).
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Thus, if we can measure a person’s political expertise, we are inherently able
to understand their level of political sophistication. And since expertise is largely
a function of knowledge, a voter’s level of knowledge may be a good measure of
sophistication. Fiske, Kinder and Larter indicate that political expertise includes
“the interlocking set of knowledge, interest andparticipation” (1983: 385), although
their measure largely reflects the latter two items.
Neuman (1986) suggests a definition of political sophistication resting on three
factors: “political salience” (based on individual interest, attentiveness, and in-
volvement), “political knowledge” (based on factual knowledge items) and “politi-
cal conceptualization” (largely based on the levels of conceptualization inConverse
(1964) and the ability to integrate political concepts).
The meaning of political expertise was further explored in an issue of Social
Cognition devoted to the topic; Krosnick (1990a), in the introduction to that issue,
explicitly relates political expertise to the conception of sophistication embodied in
Campbell et al. (1960) and Converse (1964). However, Krosnick also notes that the
measurement and definition of political expertise is subject to considerable debate:
unlike in other fields, political expertise doesn’t reflect performance per se. Instead:
[P]olitical experts are presumed to be keenly interested in political af-
fairs, to expose themselves to lots of political information (both di-
rectly through behavioral participation in political events and indirectly
through the mass media), to pay close attention to the political informa-
tion they encounter, and to reflect on the meaning and implications of
that information long after it is acquired (4).
The authors in the issue used various measures of political expertise. Krosnick
(1990b) indicates that the researchers in the volume demonstrated that
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knowledge, interest, exposure and behavioral participation have inde-
pendent effects on some phenomena. . . . Taken together, this evidence
indicates that the various dimensions of political expertise considered
here may each have unique impacts via unique mechanisms. Thus, in-
vestigators should recognize the possibility that these dimensions can
sometimes function as distinct factors (156–57).
Zaller (1990) measures political expertise in terms of four measures of “political
awareness,” based on the ability to correctly locate groups and candidates on a
7-point ideological scale (the “information scale”) and measures of participation,
media exposure, and political interest from the 1972–76 NES panel study. He
concludes:
One is politically aware to the degree that one chronically exposes one-
self to and comprehends media reports of political events, issues, and
personages. It has been argued [earlier in the article] that political
awareness, understood in this way, is best measured by tests of political
information (147; an extended discussion is at Zaller 1992: 333–39).
Luskin (1987) also makes an effort to consolidate various definitions of political
sophistication. He first famously noted that “most sophistication research skips
rapidly past definition. . . trusting a citation to Campbell et al. (1960) or Converse
(1964) to do the rest” (857). He defines political sophistication as “the extent
to which [a person’s personal belief system] is large, wide-ranging, and highly
constrained” (860), and “the political case of a more general variable,” cognitive
complexity or expertise (861). This definition suggests that, at least to him, political
sophistication and political expertise are essentially the same thing.
Luskin revisits Converse (1964), andfinds little to recommend in the correlation-
basedmeasures of sophistication suggested there (and in the schema literature), but
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finds more promise in his “active use” (AU) and “recognition and understanding”
(RU) measures, developing a sophistication measure of his own that he refers to
as S, incorporating both knowledge of politics (or information holding) and the
ideological measures derived from Converse.11 Like Krosnick (1990b) and Zaller
(1990), Luskin finds some value in using political knowledge as a measure of
sophistication, although he also suggests that measures like S are likely to perform
better (890).
In this and subsequent articles, Luskin appears to largely gloss over the distinc-
tions between terms like “political expertise,” “political knowledge,” “cognitive
complexity” and “political information” (see, for example Luskin 2002b: 220),
to which we might add “citizen competence” (Kuklinski, Quirk and Jerit 2001)
and “political literacy” (Cassel and Lo 1997). However, he cautions against some
aggregations like Zaller’s “political awareness,” which he argues “commingles
sophistication, which is what he really seems to have in mind, with education, po-
litical interest, media use, and political participation.” (235) He also suggests that
there may be some promise in examining the role of “cognitive ability” or general
intelligence as a substitute for what he views as an over-emphasis on education as
an explanatory variable in models of political knowledge (239–41).
11 More formally:
S = (I1 + I2 + 1)(D + 1)
where I1 is an active use measure based on Campbell et al. (1960)’s levels of conceptualization
(scored 0–2, with 0 representing “no issue content,” 1 representing “group benefits” and “nature
of the times” explanations, and 2 representing ideologues and near-ideologues), I2 is a recognition
and understanding measure (also scored 0–2) roughly similar to Converse (1964)’s, and D is an
eleven-point measure based on each respondents’ ability to classify the two major parties and
themselves correctly on 11 policy issues (respondents receive one point per issue “correct”), an
approach essentially the same as Zaller’s “information scale.” The range of S is 1–60 (Luskin 1990:
340).
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Largely independently of the psychological line of research, Smith (1989) arrives
at a broadly similar conclusion about the use of political knowledge as ameasure of
sophistication. He argues that neither the levels of conceptualization nor measures
of attitude consistency are worthwhile measures of political sophistication; he
argues that for most purposes in the study of mass political behavior, political
knowledge and what he terms “conceptual sophistication” are highly correlated to
the point that they are essentially indistinguishable, although he concedes that that
better measures of sophistication might reveal meaningful differences (226–27).
2.4 Rational Choice Perspectives on Sophistication
Rational choice perspectives on political sophistication have always largely focused
on the role of knowledge or information, and in particular on the costs of obtaining
that information. Downs (1957) classically argues that low levels of political infor-
mation in the public are a rational consequence of the low value of that information
tomostmembers of the public; to the extentmembers of the public acquire political
information, it is either through passive processes or due to interest in particular
issues affecting one’s self-interest.
Various authors have attempted to explain how the public can behave respon-
sibly in the absence of complete information. Much of this research has focused on
the use of heuristics or shortcuts by voters with low levels of political information.
While the earlier development of ideology-based conceptions of political sophis-
tication was of limited use to rational choice scholars, the conception of expertise
and information discussed above is much more akin to that embodied in Downs
and subsequent rational choice approaches.
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To the extent rational choice scholars have been interested in political sophisti-
cation, it has largely been to ask how voters with low levels of information are able
to make rational political decisions. McKelvey and Ordeshook (1985) were among
the first authors to attempt to reconcile rational choice models with the low levels
of political information known to exist in the public:
When voters do not possess the perfect information assumed in earlier
models, and when it is costly to obtain this information relative to
the presumed expected benefits, we assume that voters take cues from
other sources, endogenous in the system, that are easily observable and
which they believe may convey useful information. Such sources may
be other voters, interest groups, historical behavior of the candidates,
or poll results (56).
Subsequent research has focused on the use of these heuristics or cognitive
shortcuts by voters (Brady and Sniderman 1985; Sniderman, Brody and Tetlock
1991a; Lupia 1994; Lupia and McCubbins 1998). While it is apparent that not all
voters use all of these heuristics, much of the early research did not ask which
heuristics were used by whom; instead, the researchers focused on the ability of
heuristics to make voters behave as if fully informed—what Popkin (1991) referred
to as low-information rationality. Because of this failure to specify who uses which
heuristics, this research has been strongly criticized; for example, Luskin (2002b),
echoing his similar criticism of the use of “schema theory” by some scholars, states
that “while these models shed light on some of the ways in which voters may put
even crude information to use, they do not necessarily imply that verymany voters
successfully do so” (286); Kuklinski and Quirk (2000) offers a similar critique of
attempts to salvage “pure” rational choice theory with heuristics.
Nonetheless, some heuristics appear to have more promise than others for use
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byvoters. Carmines andKuklinski (1990) andMondak (1993a,b) suggest that voters
use signals from elite “insiders,” includingmembers of Congress and the president,
as cues for the positions they should take on issues. Sniderman, Glaser and Griffin
(1990), Huckfeldt et al. (1999), and Schaffner and Streb (2002) suggest the use of
partisanship as a heuristic device—for example, Schaffner and Streb argue that
party labels for otherwise unknown political candidates make it possible for voters
to infer their policy positions. Both of these heuristic devices should be at least
somewhat effective for voters with relatively low levels of political information.
Yet for the most part this literature has been silent on what level of information is
necessary to use a heuristic, or has failed to look at the possibility of heterogeneity
in heuristic use based on the level of information possessed by voters (Rivers 1988,
but see Lau and Redlawsk 2001a,b for some attempts to do just this).12
Perhaps the most promising direction in this literature has been the effort to
bring the lessons of political psychology into the rational choice literature. In the
concluding chapter ofElements of Reason, Lupia,McCubbins and Popkin (2000) sug-
gest that rational choice scholars need to recognize that “a cognition-independent
concept of expected utility maximization is not sufficient to describe uncertainty’s
effects,” (288) given the evidence that voters do not consciously use heuristics (Kuk-
linski and Quirk 2000), while at the same time indicating that scholars in political
psychology ought to recognize that choice is at the heart of political behavior. Lu-
pia, McCubbins and Popkin recommend that rather than more debates in which
12In many ways, the use of heuristics from the rational choice perspective seems to paral-
lel the schematic approaches that were popular in political psychology in the 1980s. Notably,
both approaches suggest that members of the public with more political knowledge have more
schemata/heuristics that they can draw upon. However, heuristics generally appear to be less com-
plex phenomena than the schemata posited in the political psychology literature, with schemata
being more of an overall framework for thinking about particular issues or issue domains, while
heuristics are simply shortcuts connecting bits of knowledge.
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“scholars talk[] past each other” (289), focusing on the deficiencies of work from
other traditions, scholars from the rational choice and psychological traditions
should build on contributions from each others’ fields to formulate a more unified
perspective on political reasoning and choice.
2.5 Toward a Unified Meaning of Sophistication
As Lupia (2002) notes, “[p]olitical psychologists and rational choice theorists do
not interact very much. This silence is particularly ironic when it comes to ex-
plaining political behavior, as such explanations are a core concern of both groups”
(51). It is perhaps even more ironic that despite this lack of interaction, both
groups’ approaches to the issue of sophistication have arrived at a commonground,
more-or-less independently: that an individual’s level of political sophistication is
observable in terms of that person’s level of political awareness andpolitical knowl-
edge.13
The literature subsequent to Luskin (1987), Smith (1989) and Zaller (1992) has
mostly used the respondent’s level of political information or political knowledge
as the indicator of voter sophistication; see, for example, Lupia (1994), Bartels
13The use of political knowledge as a sole indicator of sophistication may have someweaknesses;
most notably, the relationship between sophistication and “rote” knowledge (such as the ability
to identify the size and composition of particular elected and appointed bodies, or the current
occupants of relatively obscure offices) is tenuous at best. The general argument in favor of the
use of knowledge as an indicator of sophistication is that more sophisticated citizens have greater
attentiveness to the political environment and thus are exposed to more information as a matter
of course. Ideally, a test of the relative performance of particular types of knowledge questions in
discriminating between sophisticates and non-sophisticates would be worthwhile.
However, alternate measures of sophistication have weaknesses of their own: notably, Bafumi
(2003) finds greater variation in political sophistication, as measured by the levels of conceptualiza-
tion, in the high-information environment of election years than in off-year contexts. It is presently
unclear if other measures of sophistication are affected by the context in this way.
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(1996), Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996), Cassel and Lo (1997), Althaus (1998), Duch,
Palmer and Anderson (2000), Mondak (2000a,b), and Smith (2002), and in a cross-
national context, Gordon and Segura (1997), suggesting that a broad consensus on
the particular indicator to be used has been reached.14 More importantly, these
works come from both the rational choice and political psychology traditions,
suggesting that Carmines and Huckfeldt’s anticipation of a consensus between the
two traditions was well-founded.
This dissertation contributes to the literature on political sophistication in a
number of ways. First and foremost, it examines the impact of political sophis-
tication on the evaluative processes of voters and on their vote choices. Most of
the extant literature has omitted sophistication as an explanatory variable, instead
assuming that voters make evaluations and decisions in roughly the same way re-
gardless of their level of sophistication. By allowing the impact of key explanatory
variables to vary depending on the respondent’s level of sophistication, we can
see how voters’ differing abilities to make informed political evaluations affect the
decisions they make.
This dissertation also contributes to the understanding of sophistication by
proposing the use of item-response theory models, rather than additive or other
ad hoc scales, as a measurement technique when combining multiple items that
are believed to be indicators of sophistication, and demonstrating their use. Item-
response theory models provide researchers with indicators of the relative quality
of each knowledge item, and may suggest particular types of knowledge item that
better measure sophistication than others, thus allowing future survey designers
14The specificmeasure of information-holding varies in some of these studies, but the use of some
form of “knowledge” as the indicator of sophistication is common to all of these works.
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to concentrate on including items that are likely to be good indicators without
subjecting respondents to large batteries of knowledge questions.
A third contribution is to examine the role of political sophistication outside
the United States. While there are good reasons to believe that sophistication
has an important role in the decision-making of voters worldwide, few scholars
have examined this role to confirm its apparent universality. By testing the im-
pact of sophistication in a very different electoral context than that found in the
United States—a large, multiparty parliamentary system characterized by coali-
tion governments with strong religious and distributional cleavages—we can see
if sophistication is truly a universal concept.
In the next chapter, I consider the role of political information in the use of
shortcuts and heuristics by voters. The “classical” argument for the use of heuristic
devices by voters suggests that the use of cognitive shortcuts can compensate for
low levels of political information. However, it remains something of an open
question how low a level of political knowledge is sufficient for voters to use
heuristics; indeed, some heuristic devices would seem to require a great deal
of knowledge about political actors (such as candidates and parties) and their
positions on political issues. The subsequent chapter reviews the literature on
heuristics with an eye to evaluating the impact of sophistication on the shortcuts
available to, and used by, individual voters.
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CHAPTER III
HEURISTICS AND COGNITIVE SHORTCUTS
There are two distinct strands of research on how voters make political decisions in
the fields of political psychology and public opinion. The more prominent strand,
perhaps due to the focus on American politics where the impact of candidates is
especially prevalent, examines howvotersmake evaluations of political candidates,
and whether those evaluations are isolated or comparative in nature. A second,
less prominent, strand focuses on the impact of issues—how voters decide their
positions on political issues, and how they make choices when confronted with
referenda and initiatives where they are called on to make direct decisions on
matters of public policy. Despite these differences in focus, recent research on
both candidate perception and issue evaluations have found a prominent role for
cognitive shortcuts or heuristics in how voters make their decisions.
3.1 Classical Studies of Voting Behavior
Most modern research in the field of voting behavior has been organized around
three schools of thought about how voters arrive at their decisions. The first major
theory of voting behavior advanced by Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee (1954)
indicated that voting behavior was primarily a function of sociological factors ex-
ternal to the voter. This approach, often called the “Columbia” model of voting,
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posits that voting decisions are based on social group identity (based on charac-
teristics such as class, race, and religion), education and occupational status. The
Columbiamodel essentially argues for a “stimulus-response” concept of voting; the
same stimulus should always produce the same response in the voter, regardless
of changes in the voter’s immediate environment.
An alternative theory was advanced by Campbell et al. (1960), working from
national voting studies conducted at the Survey Research Center at the University
of Michigan; this approach posited a socio-psychological (or, more simply, psycho-
logical) framework, in which vote choice was not only a function of sociological
factors. Instead, the Michigan school argued, voters integrated new political stim-
uli from their environment into their decision-making process, augmenting their
socializationwith some internal processing of new information; voters in theMichi-
gan model also have an attachment to a particular political party that can evolve
over time, can vary in strength, and is based on both external and internal factors.
Although their model, particularly its conception of a “funnel of causality” into
which any conceivable factor can be placed, may be legitimately criticized for its
nonfalsifiability, it is important in that it integrates the individual into the process
of decision-making.
A third approach, advanced initially by Downs (1957), argues that voters make
decisions based on “rational choice”; they anticipate the possible outcomes of their
decision, then support the outcome that will maximize their expected utility—the
net benefit from making a particular choice. This model is valuable in that it
provides a plausible explanation of how the internal process within voters takes
place, although there are complications in dealing with the problem of making
decisions in a context of incomplete information—a condition that is exasperated
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by the low salience of political issues and candidates tomost voters (Zaller 1992: 16–
21), deliberate ambiguity and obsfucation by candidates, and the almost complete
absence of tangible benefits for voting (see e.g. Shepsle 1972; Page 1976, 1978;
Franklin 1991; Huckfeldt et al. 1998). More recent refinements of rational choice
theory (EnelowandHinich 1985;GrofmanandNorrander 1990;Alvarez andNagler
1998; Merrill III and Grofman 1999) have suggested that voters use the difference
between their position on the issues and the perceived positions of candidates
(“issue distance”) as a measure of how various outcomes will affect them, even
when they possess limited information.
Each framework offers some valuable contributions to understanding voting
decisions. The Columbia approach argues that voters make evaluations based pri-
marily on their socioeconomic status; it is almost as if voters are wired by their
socialization processes to respond to particular political stimuli in certain, specific
ways. In particular, it argues for strong influence by members of relevant social
groups, such as peers and relatives, on voting behavior. Tedin (1980) demon-
strates some of these effects on issue attitudes among recent high school graduates,
although it is fairly clear that adolescents are unlikely to be highly engaged in pol-
itics. Huckfeldt et al. (1998) find that individuals tend to associate with others who
share their own political beliefs, although people tend to exaggerate the degree
of agreement between themselves and others and tend to assume that other indi-
viduals agree with majority opinion, demonstrating that humans are rather poor
at ecological inference. Granovetter (1973) also explores the role of links between
individuals, although he emphasizes the importance of “weak ties” that connect
networks of social groups to others through members who associate with multi-
ple groups; new political ideas can be propagated through these weak ties, while
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intragroup (or strong) ties tend to reinforce older ideas.
In other recent work in the sociological tradition, Conover (1984) finds that
group identification, as measured by examining the “closest to” items on the 1980
National Election Study, affects how individuals decide which issues are most
relevant to themandwhat positions they take on those issues, although the strength
of these relationships varies quite widely among social groups. Erikson, Luttbeg
and Tedin (1980) also demonstrate some important differences between various
social groups, based on the 1976 NES, although they find that some identifications
are more salient than others, and they do not engage in any statistical tests of
these differences. Anderson, Silver and Abramson (1988) find effects on National
Election Study survey responses by blacks based on the race of their interviewer,
indicating that there may be some social-group pressure for African Americans
to falsely claim they uphold expected norms of participation when responding
to fellow blacks but not when interviewed by whites; these race-of-interviewer
effects also “induce[d] changes in actual behavior” (1988: 54) in that respondents
interviewed in the pre-election wave by blacks were more likely to actually vote
than those interviewed by whites; however, the effects found appear rather weak.
This finding suggests a form of social-group influence on reported and subsequent
political behavior by African-American interviewers on voters of the same race.
While the sociological school does explain a large portion of individual voting
behavior, it certainly does not explain all of it; as Campbell et al. argue, “[C]rucial
fluctuations in the national vote occur from election to election [that] cannot be
accounted for by independent variables which, over brief spans of time, do not
vary” (1960: 17). Can the Michigan model account for these changes more fully?
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The Michigan approach integrates internal factors into the model of voting be-
havior. This approach helps explain more of the variance in observed behavior
between voters and the degree of change in their political beliefs over time; how-
ever, like the sociological approach, it is “silent about the processes that drive [its]
explanations” (Lodge, Stroh and Wahlke 1990: 13). Examining the psychological
approach can also be complicated by what Converse (1970) calls “non-attitudes”:
the willingness of individual voters to express political attitudes that are not reflec-
tions of any particular opinion on their part. While there are ways to work around
this difficulty—for example, by measuring the strength of the emotional response
to a particular issue, as in Kinder (1994), or by asking respondents to rate the im-
portance of particular issues (Krosnick 1988)—it presents problems in looking at
political behavior that are simply not present in the sociological approach. The psy-
chological approaches are also more difficult to examine through survey research;
physical control is necessary to make definite conclusions about the impact of par-
ticular information on evaluations. The literature also suggests that psychological
approaches are difficult to evaluate because individuals cannot accurately report
their own psychological processes (Nisbett and Wilson 1977); hence we cannot be
sure that respondents are giving an accurate account of how they make evalua-
tions. For example, a voter may claim that she is evaluating a candidate based
on her specific knowledge of him, but when pressed may not actually reveal any
knowledge of the candidate. On the other hand, Alvarez and Franklin (1994) find
that voter reports of certainty about candidate positions are correlated with their
use of their impressions in candidate evaluation, while Bartels (1986) examines the
role of uncertainty in a rational choice framework, concluding that issue proximity
may be less important than uncertainty about candidate positions in candidate
selection—an effect that may also help explain incumbency advantage.
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Nevertheless, psychological approaches have been dominant in the literature—
to the point that it is difficult to distinguish between the contributions of the
Michigan approach and the broader field of political behavior—although they are
often coupled with rational choice ideas to help explain why and how individuals
act on limited information. However, as Lodge, Stroh and Wahlke argue, most
of these models are “black boxes” in which the actual decsion-making process is
ignored.
3.2 Decisions Under Limited Information
The early literature was largely silent on the question of how evaluations and vot-
ing decisions are actually made, given that voters rely on incomplete information.
Lodge (1995), McGraw, Lodge and Stroh (1990), and Wyer and Srull (1986) argue
for an “on-line” or “impression-driven” model of decision making, in which indi-
viduals add to their existing evaluations by recording their affective responses to
new information and adjusting their “tally” of positive and negative attitudes for
a particular political object according to this new response; these tallies are then
drawn upon when making political evaluations. Other scholars (including Brody
and Page 1972; Rahn, Aldrich and Borgida 1994; Enelow and Hinich 1985) support
a memory-based approach in which voters draw upon their specific knowledge of
politics and evaluate candidates based on this knowledge. While the on-line ap-
proach is generally more consistent with what we know about the level of political
knowledge of the public, memory-based models have also been demonstrated to
work in certain contexts. More to the point, neither model explicitly accounts for
the possibility that voters with different levels of political sophistication will eval-
uate candidates and make voting decisions in different ways. More recent work
30
on economic and issue voting (including Krause 1997; Gomez and Wilson 2001;
Redlawsk 2001) has suggested that more knowledgeable or educated voters rely
on memory-based criteria, while less sophisticated voters tend to evaluate policies
and issues “on-line,” and there is some evidence that how information is presented
affects how it is processed (Huffmon 2001, forthcoming).
As Downs (1957) argues, it is rational for voters to not seek information about
candidates and issues; it follows that what little knowledge most people have
about politics comes as a by-product of experiences encountered when they are not
looking for political messages, rather than from specifically searching for political
information (also see Page and Shapiro 1992: ch. 2). However, even when voters
appear to lack information, there is evidence that they act on what Popkin (1991)
terms “gut rationality.” Stroh (1995) argues that voters make a trade-off between
maximizing their accuracy and minimizing their effort in making political judg-
ments. Voters are, in his words, “pragmatic cognitive misers” who use available
information to impute the political beliefs of unknown actors from their existing
knowledge of politics. Sniderman, Glaser and Griffin (1990) similarly find that
voters, particularly those who are well-educated, can impute values onto political
actors to help clarify their voting decisions. Voters also use affective responses to
particular groups to help evaluate political issues: they know how they feel about
particular issues, and they know how they feel about particular groups, so they
use this information to impute how those groups feel about the particular issues at
hand, utilizing what Brady and Sniderman (1985) call the likability heuristic1—for
example, an individualmight reason that a Republican candidate opposes abortion
1Merriam-Webster suggests this is the only correct spelling of the word likability, and that is the
spelling used in Sniderman, Brody and Tetlock (1991a); however,Merriam-Webster says likeable is an
acceptable alternative spelling of likable.
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rights because she supports abortion rights and dislikes Republicans.
While imperfect2, this effect has been demonstrated to work in a variety of
settings (Conover and Feldman 1989; Kuklinski, Metlay and Kay 1982; Mondak
1993b; but see Martin 2001). Moreover, a similar heuristic process allows voters
to figure out where they should stand on issues based on their attitudes towards
information providers.3 Mondak (1993a) suggests that individuals use the source
of information about issues in two ways: knowledge of where others stand helps
to promote the opinion-formation process, and it can also guide the directionality
of individuals’ opinions. Yet even the heuristics available to voters are limited by
their level of political sophistication: if an American voter is unable to associate
senators JohnMcCain or Russ Feingoldwith campaign finance reform, or aGerman
voter cannot link ForeignMinister Joseph (Joschka) FischerwithGermany’s foreign
policy, he or she will be unable to make use of this association as a heuristic.4
The ability of voters to use heuristics is thus also limited by their level of political
knowledge—specifically, their ability to associate political objectswith other salient
referents. While there is considerable debate in the literature overwhether heuristic
reasoning is able to compensate for the public’s overall lack of knowledge about
2Tversky and Kahneman (1974) notes that heuristics in general lead to “incorrect” or suboptimal
conclusions. This research line has been extended further; see, for example, Tversky andKahneman
(1986) and Kahneman and Tversky (1996). While the imperfection of heuristics may seem to be
a rather trivial point, it is not obvious that all heuristics are imperfect, nor is it immediately clear
which heuristics are less perfect than others. That some scholars argue that heuristics enable voters
to behave “as if” they are fully informed—thus rehabilitating classic rational choice models of
decision-making—suggests that they believe that at least some heuristic devices are perfect.
3Brady and Sniderman use the term “likability heuristic” to refer to both processes. Sobel (1985)
proposes a similar approach based on the perceived credibility of the source of information. Iyengar
and Valentino (2000) independently derive a credibility-based approach through research into the
effects of campaign advertising. Group membership and identification may also help to promote
this process (Conover 1984; Grofman and Norrander 1990; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1990).
4See Lodge and Stroh (1993); Lodge and Taber (2000); Taber, Lodge and Glathar (2001) for a
discussion of associative reasoning in the context of the on-line model.
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politics,5 nonetheless it appears that most voters can do better than push buttons
or mark circles at random in the voting booth.
In addition to the likability heuristic, voters can make use of other heuristics,
or shortcuts, as well, such as partisanship, ideology, perceived competence, and
incumbency (Popkin 1991); they can also utilize information gleaned from group
stereotypes (Riggle et al. 1992). Particular segments of the public aremore informed
about some issues; these “issue publics” (Glynn et al. 1999: 252–53) can be a source
of political information for less informed voters if necessary. While it is irrational
for voters to collect information about all issues and all candidates, it is clear
that voters are capable of making consistent political decisions based on limited
information.
3.3 Heterogeneity in Decision-Making Processes
One of the contributions of the research into schema theory (Hamill, Lodge and
Blake 1985;McGrawand Steenbergen 1995) is the recognition that individualmech-
anisms for processing political information and making voting decisions can, and
do, differ. However, an important weakness of schema theory was that it failed to
generally advance any explanation for why these mechanisms might differ across
individuals.6 While there are studies that discuss the possibility that different types
5Notably, McKelvey and Ordeshook (1985); Popkin (1991); Page and Shapiro (1992); Lupia
(1994); Lupia and McCubbins (1998); Skalaban (1998) and Berggren (2001) argue that low levels of
sophistication and knowledge are offset by averaging effects across the population or mitigated by
institutional factors, while Bartels (1996); Althaus (1998); Kuklinski andQuirk (2000) and Kuklinski,
Quirk and Jerit (2001) note considerable divergence between the ability of less-informed and highly-
informed voters to make choices consistent with “fully informed” preferences.
6See Kuklinski, Luskin and Bolland (1991); however, Fiske and Kinder (1981) at least discuss the
possibility of systematic relationship between expertise and schema use.
33
of voters use different decision rules in a systematic way,7 relatively few scholars
have recognized that a voting model can and should differ in this way.
One fairly obvious reason why these mechanisms should differ is that some
voters havemore understanding of howpoliticswork than others; that is, that some
voters are more “politically sophisticated” than others (see Sniderman, Brody and
Tetlock 1991b: 18–20). I posit that the politically unsophisticated must necessarily
employ little political knowledge when voting or evaluating candidates, while
more sophisticated voters—who are capable of making stronger links between
pieces of political knowledge—are able to bringmore data to bear when evaluating
candidates or making voting decisions.8
The definition andmeasurement of sophistication has seen considerable debate
in the literature in the past two decades, as discussed in Chapter 2. While no
consensus on the best possible measure has been reached, despite a volley of
articles since Luskin (1987) (see e.g. Iyengar 1985; Krosnick 1990a; Fiske, Lau and
Smith 1990; Zaller 1990; Mondak 2001), Zaller (1985) found that the interviewer
evaluation of the respondent’s level of political knowledge was a reliable and
unbiased measure, at least in the context of face-to-face interviews such as those
conducted (until recently) by the National Election Study (see Zaller 1992: 339).
7Rivers (1988) finds that the effects of partisanship are stronger in an issue-voting model when
the assumption of homogeneity in the use of partisanship is relaxed in a model.
8This is consistent with Zanna, Klosson and Dalley (1976), who find that individuals who have
more non-political information available to them are more capable of arriving at accurate and
reliable conclusions.
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Not surprisingly, the concept ofpolitical sophistication (or “expertise”or “knowl-
edge”) has been utilized rather extensively in the political science literature, al-
though often in a “black box” mode, with or without interaction with other vari-
ables. The concept of sophisticationunderlies the researchofCarmines andStimson
(1980, 1982, 1989) into “easy” and “hard” issues, particularly the issue of race—
presumably the sophisticated are more capable of making sense of issues that
opinion leaders have failed to make “easy” for the public.9 Sophistication is also
believed to affect whether voters engage in issue voting (Jacoby 1991; Goren 1997)
and economic voting (Duch, Palmer and Anderson 2000; Gomez andWilson 2001),
how voters use information presented in the media (Zaller 1996; Miller and Kros-
nick 2000), whether voters support civil liberties for various nonconformist groups
in society (Bobo and Licari 1989), and perhaps whether or not voters can organize
political issues into consistent general attitudes (Campbell et al. 1960; Sidanius
1988; Lusk and Judd 1988; but see Goren 2000 who finds limited support for this
thesis).
However, the application of political sophistication in cognitive models of po-
litical behavior has been relatively limited, despite the emphasis on sophistication
underlying Sniderman, Glaser and Griffin (1990) and Sniderman, Brody and Tet-
lock (1991b). In addition to those works, only Lau and Redlawsk (2001a,b) appear
to have considered an interaction between sophistication and the use of various
heuristics; Lau and Redlawsk find, as I suggest here, that heuristics are a more use-
ful tool for the politically sophisticated due to their greater ability to relate referents
with one another.
9Also see Sniderman and Hagen (1984), who similarly conclude that the public is relatively
well-informed about racial issues.
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The following two chapters investigate the relationship between heuristic use
andpolitical sophistication ingreaterdetail, demonstrating that theuseof heuristics
appears to be based, at least in part, on the ability of voters to make connections
between political issues and actors. This finding indicates that more sophisticated
voters are better able tomake use of heuristic devices—which suggests that, instead
of allowing uninformed voters to behave “as if” fully informed, heuristics enable
more informed voters to make better political decisions than their less informed
counterparts in the electorate.
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CHAPTER IV
THE LIKABILITY HEURISTIC IN POLICY
EVALUATION
A widely recognized debate in the political behavior field is whether voters have
sufficient political interest and knowledge to engage in policy voting. There is an
extensive body of research documenting the low levels of political sophistication
among the electorate (e.g. Converse 1970; Neuman 1986; Smith 1989); however,
there is also more recent research contending that citizens can behave as if fully
informed through the use of cognitive shortcuts or heuristics (e.g. Lupia 1992, 1994;
but see Bartels 1996.) The key question in this debate is whether these cognitive
shortcuts are capable of compensating for theknown informational shortcomingsof
the electorate—and thus whether voters can make reasonable decisions, consistent
with their “fully informed” preferences, based on limited information.
Reflected in this debate is the implicit assumption that a negative relationship
exists between sophistication and the use of heuristics (e.g. Sniderman, Brody and
Tetlock 1991a). If heuristics address an information shortfall, it is logical to assume
that less sophisticated citizens are more likely to use heuristics than are more
sophisticated citizens. In this chapter, I question whether this assumption holds
for all heuristics in all policy contexts. More specifically, I propose a more general
theory of heuristic use in which the conditioning role of sophistication depends on
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the policy context. A necessary condition for heuristic use is recognizing that a
connection exists between the heuristic and the policy area. I posit that for certain
heuristics and policy contexts this condition is only met at medium to high levels
of sophistication, thereby producing a curvilinear or positive relationship between
sophistication and heuristic use.1
The theoretical discussion presented here focuses on the use of a likability heuris-
tic. But contrary to Brady and Sniderman (1985), I consider affect toward a policy
maker rather than a group. In turn, the necessary condition for use of this likability
heuristic is whether the respondent recognizes the connection between the policy
maker and the policy realm about which they are asked to express an opinion.
Those who fail to recognize the connection do not use the heuristic, so heuristic
use can actually increase rather than decrease with sophistication. I theorize that
the likelihood of recognizing the connection varies with public awareness of the
policy maker and the salience of the policy area.
In order to investigate our theoretical argument, I consider attitudes toward
health care reform at the beginning of the first Clinton Administration. At the
time of Bill Clinton’s inauguration, most pundits believed that his plan to cre-
ate a government-run health care system for all Americans would be a major
achievement of his administration. The proposal was the centerpiece of Clinton’s
legislative program during his first two years in office, and he took the unprece-
dented step of delegating the task of drafting the legislation to a task force led by
1This supposition would be consistent with Zaller (1992)’s receive-accept-sample model of opin-
ionation; however, voters who have more available heuristic devices will favor some sort of sub-
optimal search strategy (such as sampling per Zaller, or perhaps satisficing, per Simon 1957) to
decide which heuristic to use when making their decisions, which suggests that even the most
sophisticated voters are likely to rely on only a few heuristics in practice.
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his wife, Hillary Rodham Clinton. Her public leadership on the issue made her
name virtually synonymouswith the program; it became known, particularly to its
detractors, as “Hillarycare.” By the time of the 1994 midterm elections, however,
the program was widely unpopular.2
What accounts for the unpopularity of the Clinton approach? I believe that
citizens, particularly those with higher levels of sophistication, came to associate
the plan with Hillary Clinton, thus basing their evaluations of the plan on their
attitudes towards the first lady. This effect should not be as pronounced when
respondents are asked to evaluate whether or not the United States should have
any government-run insurance program.
4.1 Theoretical Background
The literature on public opinion andpolitical psychology suggests that the opinions
that respondents provide in survey responses are usually not directly recalled from
memory; instead, they are believed to be generated “on-line” by the respondent
from the most accessible information in their heads (Lodge, McGraw and Stroh
1989; McGraw, Lodge and Stroh 1990; Lodge, Stroh and Wahlke 1990; Zaller 1992).
This has important implications for the study of opinion, as respondents’ professed
attitudes may differ depending on how questions are phrased, sometimes in un-
predictable ways.3 Research has also shown that survey respondents often give
2The 1994 National Election Study (Rosenstone et al. 1999b) indicates that only 36.7% (plus or
minus 2.5%) of Americans supported the plan (N = 1659). Even among supporters of government
insurance in general, only 56.9% also supported the Clinton plan (N = 260). See also Koch (1998).
A complete study of attitudes towards Hillary Clinton during this period can be found in Burden
and Mughan (1999).
3See, for example, footnote 73 in Glynn et al. (1999: 297), which details how the difference of one
word in a survey question caused a 37-percentage-point difference in survey responses.
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inconsistent responses to identical questions, suggesting that survey responsesmay
be contaminated by error from “non-attitudes” expressed by citizens lacking true
attitudes towards the subjects at hand (Converse 1970).
The rational choice tradition in political science argues that it is rational be-
havior for voters to not seek out information about issues or candidates; thus, the
knowledge most people have about politics is a by-product of exposure to infor-
mation encountered when they are not seeking political information (Downs 1957;
Page and Shapiro 1992). However, the literature on the use of heuristics suggests
that voters can “make do” with limited information, perhaps relying on what Pop-
kin (1991) terms “gut rationality.” One heuristic device that has been suggested
is a likability heuristic (Brady and Sniderman 1985): for example, a voter might
use this heuristic to conclude that a Democratic candidate opposes increased de-
fense spending because the voter favors higher spending on defense and dislikes
Democrats. This heuristic has been demonstrated to work fairly well in a variety
of settings.4
Theability tomake connectionsbetweenattitudes towards informationproviders
and the programs they espouse is necessarily limited by the amount of cognition
needed for the individual to use their feelings towards that provider in forming
an evaluation. For example, a typical voter will have more difficulty connecting
her attitude toward President George W. Bush to his “No Child Left Behind” ed-
ucation initiative—a relatively non-salient and obscure program—than she will in
associating the president with the “War on Terror” campaign against al-Qaeda and
4An extended discussion of various heuristics, and the ability of voters to make use of the
likability heuristic, is in Chapter 3.
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A: Has Policy Opinion
B: Has Opinion about Policymaker
C: Makes Connection
A
B
C
X
Figure 1: Venn diagram of policy and policymaker opinions.
other anti-Western terror groups. Those voters with the highest levels of sophisti-
cation should be able to connect Bush with both issues; however, we would expect
a greater falloff in association between Bush and “No Child Left Behind” as we
work our way through to lower levels of sophistication in the electorate, while
the falloff in the Bush–“War on Terror” association should be less steep, as it is a
more well-known theme. This pattern suggests that the likability heuristic is more
effective for sophisticated voters, who have more information to draw upon, than
unsophisticated voters.5
For example, on any given issue some group of voters (A) may have an opinion
about that issue, while another, possibly overlapping, group of voters (B) may have
5This is consistent with Zanna, Klosson and Dalley (1976), who find that individuals who have
more non-political information available to them are more capable of arriving at accurate and
reliable conclusions.
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an opinion about the policymakerwho is responsible for that issue. We also assume
that a group of voters (C), who need not have an opinion about either the issue or
policymaker, will recognize the connection between the policymaker and the issue;
see Figure 1 for a Venn diagram that illustrates the case where the policymaker
is reasonably salient. Voters who have an opinion about the policymaker and are
aware of her connection to the issue, but do not have a preexisting opinion about
it (in set theoretic terms, (C ∩ B) ∩ A¯, the area where C and B intersect without
overlapping A; on the applicable illustrations, I have denoted this subset by X),
can use their attitudes toward the policymaker to decide their own position on
the issue; they are potential users of the likability heuristic. In some cases (such
as in Figure 2), the policymaker may be so obscure that everyone who knows
she is responsible for the issue—presumably the most sophisticated voters—will
also have an opinion about the policy, as the region B (representing those with
an opinion about the policymaker) is fully within A (representing those with an
opinion about the issue), making the heuristic useless for those voters.6
Furthermore, we might expect a nonlinear relationship between voter sophisti-
cation and the use of the likability heuristic; among voters with low sophistication
relatively few voters will have an opinion about either the policymaker or the is-
sue, while among the highly sophisticated most voters will have already formed
an opinion about the issue and thus will not need a heuristic (see Figure 3). For
many important issues and public figures, I believe the moderately sophisticated
6For example, consider the case of Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, perhaps the
most prominent “neoconservative” in the Bush administration and an early advocate of regime
change in Iraq; only ardent viewers of Sunday morning television shows would know who he
is—indeed, most voters asked about Wolfowitz would probably think they were being asked a
question about CNN anchor Wolf Blitzer. Any voter who has an opinion about Wolfowitz would
almost certainly have an opinion about the 2003 conflict with Iraq.
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A: Has Policy Opinion
B: Has Opinion about Policymaker
C: Makes Connection
A
B
C
Figure 2: The case of an obscure policymaker.
will be most likely to need and use this heuristic.7
For some issues and policy makers, however, the connection between the issue
and the policymakermight be obscure enough that the use of the likability heuristic
increases with sophistication (but not so obscure that the likability heuristic is irrel-
evant). In this case, the size of the C subset for Medium Sophistication in Figure 3
decreases in size so that the (C ∩ B) ∩ A¯ subset is larger for High Sophistication.
Alternatively, low salience issues might produce positive relationships between
sophistication and heuristic use. In this case, the intersection of subsetsA and C for
High Sophistication decreases enough in size so that a positive relationship results.
7In important ways, this relationship parallels Zaller (1992)’s finding that moderately sophisti-
cated voters are the most likely to receive political information from multiple sources, and hence
are more susceptible to persuasion by media campaigns.
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A: Has Policy Opinion
B: Has Opinion about Policymaker
C: Makes Connection
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Low Sophistication Medium Sophistication High Sophistication
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Figure 3: A nonlinear relationship between sophistication and heuristic use.
In the case of the issueof governmenthealth insurance, there is anopportunity to
test this effect. While Americans had generally been bombarded with information
about President Clinton’s support for a national health insurance system, less
sophisticated voters, particularly those who had ceased to be attentive after the
1992 campaign, would not be as likely to associate Hillary Clinton with the issue of
health care reform. Less sophisticated voters would also be less likely to connect
Mrs. Clinton’s role in producing the Clinton health insurance proposal to attitudes
towards health insurance in general. Accordingly, for less sophisticated voters
responses to questions about Clinton’s approach to health care reform should be
based in part on attitudes toward Hillary Clinton, while thoughts about health
care reform in general should not be associated, due to the greater number of
associations that would have to be made.
In sum, the expectation is that a curvilinear relationship exists between sophis-
tication and the use of affect toward Hillary Clinton as a heuristic for evaluating
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health care reform. Yet, it is also possible that Hillary Clinton’s role in formulating
the Clinton Administration’s health care policy was obscure enough that a positive
relationship exists.
4.2 Hypotheses and Independent Variables
The following hypotheses about health care reform are suggested either by the
literature or simply by common sense:
1. Respondents who do not have health care insurance should generally be
more supportive of a government-run health care system. (Operationalized
by V941022.)
2. Respondents who find medical bills to be a financial burden should be more
supportive of a government-run health care system. (Operationalized by
V941025.)
3. Republican identifiers should be less supportive of a government-run health
care system than Democratic identifiers. Partisanship is operationalized by
V940655, with higher levels indicating greater strength of Republican identi-
fication.8
4. Citizenswho like Bill Clinton should bemore supportive of a government-run
health care system.
5. Citizens who like Hillary Clinton should be more supportive of the Clinton
health care plan, but they should not be more supportive of government-run
health care in general.
6. Political sophisticates should use their attitudes towards Hillary Clinton as a
heuristic for evaluating government-run health care; thus, sophisticates who
like Hillary Clinton will be more supportive of government insurance (in the
8Bartels (2000) suggests that the party identification scale does not truly reflect the strength of
partisan feeling; notably, that weak partisans tend to be less partisan in their behavior than so-called
“independent leaners.”
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abstract or the Clinton plan), while sophisticates who dislike Hillary Clinton
will be less supportive.9
7. In addition, control variables are introduced for gender (V941434), region
(V940011), age (V941203), and race (V941434).
Affect towards Bill Clinton is operationalized by responses to a feeling ther-
mometer, V940223; likability of Hillary Clinton is similarly derived from V940229.
The level of political sophistication was measured using the interviewer’s rating of
the respondent’s intelligence, V941439. 10
4.3 Data and Methodology
The data for this study are taken from the 1994 American National Election Study
conducted by the Center for Political Studies and Survey Research Center at the
University of Michigan (Rosenstone et al. 1999b). Of the 1795 respondents, 1536
(85.6 percent) had usable responses to the dependent variables operationalizing the
hypotheses. Missing values of independent variables were set to the mean in the
case of continuous variables, and set to the modal category in the case of discrete
variables.11
9Note that there is no direct measure in the 1994 ANES of whether or not the respondent either
associated Mrs. Clinton with either the health care reform issue or the administration’s handling
of the issue. Instead, correlation between attitudes toward Mrs. Clinton and the dependent
variable is assumed to represent whether or not the respondent made the association. However,
other plausible sources for an association between attitudes toward the first lady and these issues,
including partisanship, attitudes toward the president, and demographic factors, are controlled for
in the model.
10This measure is believed to be quite reliable and is comparable in its findings to summated
scales based on political knowledge. In addition, using post-high school education as a proxy for
sophistication in the model gave very similar results. See Zaller (1992: 339) for a discussion.
11The treatment of missing data in political science is something of an ongoing controversy;
for a recent discussion, see King et al. (2001). The ideal solution is to use estimation techniques
like full-information maximum likelihood or marginal data augmentation that avoid the need for
imputation techniques; unfortunately, “canned” routines for common models making use of these
techniques are still rare (the most complete implementation appears to be Martin and Quinn 2003).
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The dependent variables in this analysis are derived from two items in the
1994 ANES. Respondents’ support for the Clinton reform plan was derived from
questions asking whether respondents approved or disapproved of how President
Clinton was handling health care reform and how strongly they held that view
(V940207); respondents indicating approval were coded as supporters of the Clin-
ton plan. Respondents’ attitudes toward government-run health care in general
were measured by a question asking where respondents placed themselves on a
seven-point scale between supporting government-run insurance and private in-
surance (V940950); respondents rating themselves in the interval 1–3 on the scale
were coded as supporters of government-run insurance.
Both dependent variables are dichotomous in nature; accordingly, an estimator
such as logit or probit (Aldrich and Nelson 1984; Greene 2000) would normally
be appropriate. However, as the error terms of the two models are likely to be
correlated, an extension of probit known as bivariate probit (Greene 2000) is, in
general, a more appropriate estimator. In the bivariate probit model, the joint
probability that Y1 = yi1 and Y2 = yi2 is given by
Pr(Y1 = yi1,Y2 = yi2) = Φ2(qi1β′1xi1, qi1β
′
2xi2, qi1qi2ρ),
qi j = 2yi j − 1, j = 1, 2
where Φ2 is the bivariate normal cumulative density function,
Φ2(w1,w2, ρ) =
∫ w2
−∞
∫ w1
−∞
e−(1/2)(z21+z22−2ρz1z2)/(1/ρ2)
2pi
√
1 − ρ2 dz1 dz2.
The bivariate probit model produces estimates of the coefficient vectors β1 and
β2 for the two equations; ρ, the correlation between the error terms ( j) of the
equations; and standard errors for these parameters. We can then test whether
or not the correlation between the equations is statistically significant, to decide
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whether the bivariate estimator was necessary.12 The bivariate probit model was
estimated using the biprobit command in Stata 7.
4.4 Results
The results of the bivariate probit model appear in Table 2. The ρ parameter is
highly significant, indicating that the error structures of the equations are corre-
lated, suggesting that the bivariate model is the correct specification. The models
together perform substantially better than the naı¨ve model that respondents op-
pose government insurance and do not support Clinton’s handling of the health
insurance issue.
Aswemight expect, respondentswhodo not have difficulty affording their own
health care expenses and those with health insurance are less supportive of gov-
ernment financing of health insurance. However, these relationships completely
disappear when they evaluate Clinton’s handling of the health care issue. While it
is possible that this is the result of Clinton’s failure to pass legislation mandating
government health insurance, it is more likely that voters considered the Clinton
plan in partisan terms. It is surprising, however, that the groups the plan was
primarily intended to benefit were no more supportive of Clinton’s handling of
the health care issue than similar individuals with affordable access to health care
through existing channels, suggesting that the administration’s campaign in favor
of the proposal had not succeeded in convincing these core constituencies that
would have been needed to help pressure legislators to support the proposal. As
12If the correlation is not significant, separate (univariate) probit estimation of the equations is
preferable as bivariate probit is less efficient than estimating separate models when the errors are
not correlated. (Greene 2000: 853–4)
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Coefficients (Robust Standard Error)
Variable Gov’t Insurance Clinton’s Handling
0.010*** 0.019***
Feeling Thermometer: Bill Clinton (0.002) (0.003)
–0.018*** –0.004
Feeling Thermometer: Hillary Clinton (0.005) (0.006)
–0.393*** –0.139
Can afford health care expenses (dummy) (0.078) (0.088)
–0.374** 0.126
Has health insurance (dummy) (0.134) (0.125)
–0.112*** –0.100***
Party identification scale (0.021) (0.023)
0.108 0.028
Black (dummy) (0.120) (0.127)
0.002 –0.149†
Female (dummy) (0.073) (0.081)
–0.049 –0.202*
South (dummy) (0.075) (0.084)
–0.179* –0.206*
Over 50 (dummy) (0.075) (0.085)
–0.501*** –0.633***
Respondent intelligence rating (0.107) (0.158)
0.008*** 0.008**
FT Hillary × intelligence (0.001) (0.002)
1.235*** –0.349
Constant (0.309) (0.415)
0.155**
ρ (0.050)
Log likelihood –1508.4549
Wald test of full model: χ2(22) 635.33***
• Coefficients are maximum-likelihood bivariate probit estimates. N = 1536.
• *** indicates p(z) < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; † p < .10 (two-tailed test).
Table 2: Bivariate probit model of support for government health insurance and
Clinton’s handling of health care reform.
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we would probably expect, partisanship affected support for both government in-
surance and Clinton’s handling of the issue; Republicans were less supportive than
Democrats of both Clinton’s proposal and the idea of government insurance.
An interesting finding was that Americans over the age of 50 were less support-
ive of government insurance in general and the Clinton health care plan than we
might otherwise expect. This population includes all of the beneficiaries of Medi-
care, whomwe would at least expect to support the idea of government insurance,
if not the Clinton proposal. It is possible that respondents over 50 were concerned
that universal health care coverage might lead to greater rationing of health care in
the Medicare program or increases in tax rates (or retail prices, if employer-based
financing of the program were instituted) that seniors would receive a dispropor-
tionately small marginal benefit from; it is also possible that older Americans were
reflecting a lack of enthusiasm for the Medicare program, and thus government-
run insurance in general, in their responses to both questions, as they would be
more familiar with government insurance than younger Americans.
Another significant finding was a regional disparity in support for the health
care plan; respondents in southern states were significantly less likely to support
Clinton’s handling of the health care issue, despite not being significantly less likely
to support government insurance in general. It is unclear why this relationship
might appear; it may reflect a regional sense that Clinton’s program would be too
bureaucratic, or it may be an artifact of where opponents of the Clinton proposal
targeted their media campaigns against the plan.13
13Presumably, the opponents of the proposal targeted their lobbying pressure on conservative
and/or weak Democratic incumbents and their districts; in 1994, this was the case in many parts of
the south.
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Attitudes towardsBill Clinton affected support for both insurance ingeneral and
the Clinton plan in particular; in fact, it was the best predictor of support for both.
As President Clinton had, by the 1994 elections, been personally associatedwith the
health care issue for nearly three years, it is not surprising that attitudes towards
Clinton carried over into support for insurance in abstract terms; it is also likely
that he was personally associated by respondents with “the government.” This
variable may also be capturing some underlying partisan or ideological attitudes
that are not tapped by the party identification scale.
Perhaps the most interesting findings revolve around respondent attitudes to-
wards Hillary Clinton and sophistication. Due to the interaction with the respon-
dent’s level of intelligence, a direct discussion of the coefficients would be mis-
leading. However, from Figure 4, we can see the interaction between intelligence
and attitudes towards the first lady rather clearly. As we might expect, there was
a curvilinear relationship at work, with attitudes towards Hillary Clinton having a
greater effect on support for both the Clinton approach and government insurance
in general among the politically sophisticated, and a smaller effect among the less
sophisticated.
4.5 Conclusions
This chapter examined the connections between attitudes towards a political actor
(the first lady) and an issue that the actor had been actively involved in promot-
ing. The central finding of this analysis is that voters’ ability to use their attitudes
towards actors to locate themselves in policy space is limited by their ability to
connect the actors to the policies they espouse. Politically sophisticated voters
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Figure 4: Estimated effect of affect toward Hillary Clinton on approval of health
care reform by respondent’s level of sophistication.
used evaluations of Hillary Clinton to place themselves in response to a question
about the abstract concept of “government-run health insurance” than less sophis-
ticated voters, but those differences were less significant when voters were asked
to evaluate the President’s handling of the issue. More generally, it appears that
less sophisticated voters have fewer resources to draw upon when deciding their
own issue positions.
This chapter also suggests that attitudes towards political actors other than
the president may be important in evaluating proposals by the executive branch,
particularly when those actors are publicly-visible advocates of a proposal. While
few—if any—administrations have had such a high-profile task delegated publicly
to a publicly-visible figure, presidents cannot rely on their own popularity to curry
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support for proposals that have been associatedwith other actors. In particular, we
mightwant to look at the role of attitudes towardsmembers of Congress in promot-
ing public support for legislation they are shepherding through Congress on behalf
of the president. In a comparative context, we might also want to examine the role
of attitudes towards cabinet ministers in public support for a government’s legisla-
tive proposals; for example, attitudes towardsBritain’sChancellor of theExchequer
may be used as heuristics in addition to attitudes towards the primeminister or rul-
ing party when politically sophisticated Britons consider economic policy issues.
This relationship might be particularly important in multi-party cabinets, where
ministers from different parties may be able to act as policy entrepreneurs against
the wishes of the prime minister.
In broader terms, this chapter helps inform the wider debate about how voters
use heuristics in making political decisions. It appears that more sophisticated
voters are more able to draw upon multiple guides for heuristic evaluation than
less sophisticated voters, particularly when evaluating more abstract concepts.
The “rational public” is rational only to the extent that voters are able to draw
upon information to arrive at conclusions about issues, and this ability is largely
dependent on how many sources of information voters can draw upon when
making their evaluations.
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CHAPTER V
COALITION PERFORMANCE AND THE
ASSESSMENT OF PARTY RESPONSIBILITY
When there is a single actor (either a party or candidate) that is responsible for
government actions—as is often the case in the United States or in “Westminster”
democracies such as Britain or Canada—the attribution of responsibility is gen-
erally quite straightforward. However, when multiple parties are responsible for
policies, as is often the case in democracies outside the English-speaking world, it
is possible that these attributions will be more difficult for voters to make.
This chapter examines the relationship between political sophistication and the
assessment of party responsibility for government actions in the Netherlands, a
country with a long history of coalition government. The findings suggest that
voters generally hold the lead party in the coalition responsible for coalition per-
formance, althoughmore politically sophisticated voters will also hold other mem-
bers of the coalition accountable. This pattern suggests that parties who want to
retain support but still have a significant share in power are often able to deflect
responsibility among those dissatisfied with the government’s performance to the
largest party, thereby casting doubt on the ability of voters to hold multiple parties
accountable for a coalition’s performance.
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5.1 Theoretical Background
The possibility of the use of party affect as a heuristic by voters has been acknowl-
edged in political science for over forty years. The common party identification
scale used in theUnited Stateswas defined byCampbell et al. (1960) as ameasure of
a citizen’s “affective orientation” toward the twomajor parties. The role of parties in
modern industrialized democracies—in terms of organizing political competition
by providing a common “brand” for like-minded political candidates, translating
preferences into policy, and motivating the electorate—is such that democracy’s
persistence in their absence would be “unthinkable” (Schattschneider 1942: 1; also
see Aldrich 1995).
Rational choice models of voting behavior postulate that citizens seek to max-
imize their utility when voting (Downs 1957),1 and empirical studies suggest that
voters do so by engaging in retrospective voting (Key 1966; Kramer 1971; Fiorina
1981)—that is, by evaluating candidates and parties based on their past perfor-
mance, rather than evaluating themprospectively based on their promises of future
behavior. Much of the literature on this question has focused on economic voting, a
form of retrospective voting that focuses on the performance of the economy under
the stewardship of a particular candidate or party (Lewis-Beck 1988).
However, the ability of voters to engage in any form of retrospective voting
is necessarily limited by their ability to attribute blame or credit to a particular
1 InDowns’ initial formulation, the act of voting in andof itselfwas seen as irrational. Attempts to
reconcile this “paradox of voting” have had decidedly mixed results; see e.g. Riker and Ordeshook
(1968), Ferejohn and Fiorina (1974), Cyr (1975), Katosh and Traugott (1982), Sigelman and Berry
(1982), and Fiorina (1990). More recently, Bendor, Diermeier and Ting (2003) attempt to resolve the
paradox by fusing rational choice and psychological explanations.
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party or candidate. Erroneous attributions of responsibility may lead to perverse
outcomes—for example, “punishing” a party or candidate who is out of power
for actions it was not responsible for. While some scholars argue that voters are
able to make do with limited information, behaving with low-information or “gut
rationality” (Popkin 1991), there is a considerable body of evidence to the contrary.
One important factor that may limit the ability of voters to make informed
choices is the institutional configuration. Some configurations make it easier for
voters to properly attribute blame than others; the simplest, most clearly responsi-
ble case, is where a single unitary actor can be blamed (or credited) for the actions
of the government, as is the case in what Lijphart (1999) describes as “Westminster-
style” democracies: governments where all executive and legislative power is in
the hands of a single party. Not only are such governments “efficient,” in the
famous phrase of Bagehot (1964), they also concentrate accountability. Voters who
dislikedMargaret Thatcher’s policies could easily express their displeasure by vot-
ing for another party’s candidates for Parliament, and if enough voters did so, the
Conservatives—and Thatcher—would be removed from power.
Shugart and Carey (1992) expand on this theme in their discussion of two ad-
vantages of presidential democracies over parliamentary ones. They argue that
there are two components of responsibility: accountability and identifiability. Ac-
countability is tied directly to the theme of retrospective evaluation:
Accountability describes the degree and means by which elected pol-
icymakers are responsible to citizens. The more straightforward the
connection between the choices made by the electorate at the ballot
box and the expectations to which policymakers are held, the greater
accountability. Accountability is closely related to concepts such as
retrospective voting (Fiorina 1981), or “throwing the rascals out.” Un-
der these conceptions of electoral connection between constituents and
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government, voters need not be able to assess prospectively the policy
directions with which they wish to endow a mandate on the govern-
ment (Riker 1982b). Rather, voters need only have the opportunity to
impose sanctions on elected officials at the next election. (44)
They argue that parliamentary regimes often undermine this accountability be-
cause new governments can be formed without an election, due to “shifting coali-
tions in the assembly.” Such coalition shifts can create confusion in the electorate
and make it harder for voters to attribute responsibility for policies, particularly in
countries with a history of volatile coalitions such as Italy.
Shugart and Carey also argue that identifiability is an important aspect of re-
sponsibility. They define it as “the degree to which voters can identify before the
election the likely alternative governments thatmay emerge after the election” (45).
Supporters of a particular party may vote for it, but will have no control over what
other parties it chooses to enter a coalition with. For example, a German voter may
support the Christian Democrats, but prefer a Christian Democrat-Liberal coalition
to aChristianDemocrat-Social Democrat coalition. Shugart andCarey indicate that
this lack of identifiability in multiparty democracies hinders the ability of citizens
to vote prospectively; by contrast, in a presidential system (or a “Westminster”
parliamentary system), the voter knows what sort of government she is getting for
her vote when she casts her ballot.
Federalism may also make a difference: voters in a unitary state may be able
to connect policy problems more readily to the government than those in a fed-
eral republic, where subnational governments like states or provinces may have
significant policy responsibility. Divisions in control between the legislature and
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the executive in presidential systems—the phenomenon known as divided gov-
ernment in the United States and cohabitation in France—may also affect the ability
of voters to assign credit or blame for economic conditions such as unemployment
and inflation, or the results of other policies (Stein 1990; but, for evidence to the
contrary, see Norpoth 2001 and Nadeau and Lewis-Beck 2001).2 Lack of cohesion
in legislative parties may also have an effect on perceived responsibility.
Taken together, these institutional and contextual factors produce varying de-
grees of clarity of responsibility. Powell and Whitten (1993), in their study of
economic voting in 19 industrialized democracies, find that clarity of responsibil-
ity is strongly associatedwith economic voting at the aggregate level, withminority
governments faring significantly between than either majority coalitions or single-
partymajority governments; the same effect was also noted by Palmer andWhitten
(1999) over a longer time-span (also seeAnderson 1995, 2000). Examining the effects
of divided government, Nicholson, Segura andWoods (2002) find that presidential
approval in the United States is higher during periods of divided government,
suggesting that divided government insulates presidents from responsibility in
the eyes of the electorate. Most of these studies have focused on aggregate-level
evidence of retrospective voting; however, in an analysis of state-level attributions
in the United States of blame for economic conditions, Rudolph (2003) finds that
evaluations of state governors are conditioned on whether the individual voter
attributes responsibility for economic conditions within the state to the governor
or the state legislature.
2For example, during the 1990s in the United States, both the Republican-led Congress and
Democratic president Bill Clinton took credit for policy achievements such as welfare reform and
balancing the federal budget.
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There is another factor thatmayalsomatter in retrospective evaluations: whether
the voter is politically sophisticated enough to understand the relationship between
political actors and policy outcomes. Duch, Palmer and Anderson (2000) find that
politically sophisticated voters’ retrospective and prospective evaluations of the
American national economy are strongly affected by their partisan preferences,
thus producing a systematic bias in individual-level measures of economic vot-
ing, while Gomez and Wilson (2001) find that less sophisticated American voters
attribute credit and blame for macroeconomic conditions to the president, while
more sophisticated voters do not, as they recognize the president’s relative lack
of control over the economy. More generally, we would expect the clarity of re-
sponsibility for government policies to affect the level of sophistication needed to
attribute blame or credit.
5.2 The Case of the Netherlands
The Kingdom of the Netherlands provides a fertile testing ground for the impor-
tance of political sophistication. Historically, it has been a stereotypical “consensus
democracy,” and it has never had a single-partymajority government in itsmodern
history (Timmermans and Andeweg 2000). Because of this history, if there were
ever a country with a record of coalition government where even the least sophis-
ticated voter would be able to make retrospective evaluations, that country would
be the Netherlands.
However, the 1994 elections produced a significant shock to the preexisting
system. For the first time since 1917, the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA)3 was
3While the CDA was formed in 1977, the three Christian parties—the Anti-Revolutionary Party
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not a member of the coalition that formed. Instead, the coalition that formed after
the election consisted of three parties—the social democratic PvdA (or Labor Party),
the center-left reformist Democrats 66 (D66), and the liberal4 People’s Party for
Freedom and Democracy (VVD). While the PvdA and D66 had governed together
in the past, no coalition prior to 1994 had included both PvdAandVVDdue towhat
had appeared to be irreconcilable differences in their preferred economic policies.5
Nevertheless, the coalition, headed by PvdA leader Wim Kok, was broadly
successful. Irwin (1999) suggests that the main opposition to government policies
was not provided by any of the opposition parties, but rather by Frits Bolkestein,
the Liberal leader, who did not take a position in the cabinet, and came to be seen
by many as the effective leader of the opposition—even though his own party
was a major partner in the governing coalition.6 According to Irwin, most of the
opposition parties, including the traditionally-centrist CDA, attempted to position
themselves to the left of Labor (who were seen as having moved to the right), with
mixed results.
(ARP), Christian Historical Union (CHU), and Catholic People’s Party (KVP)—that joined to form
it had previously acted much like a single party, even though the former two parties drew mostly
on Protestant support while the latter was supported by Catholics.
4In the European, pro-free market sense.
5PvdA historically drewmost of its support from the working class, as a typical European social
democratic “mass party” supported by trade unions. The CDA and its predecessors, as a typical
continental Christian democratic party, generally appealed to practicing Christians, particularly
among the lower and middle classes. D66 is a “left-libertarian” party that seeks a more inclusive
Dutch political system and generally appeals to the intellectual elite of Dutch society; it generally
competes for support with PvdA and the Greens. The VVD is a traditional European liberal party
with strong support among the upper class, entrepreneurs, and the less-devout parts of the middle
class.
6As Andeweg (1996) notes, members of the coalition are required to resign their seats in parlia-
ment as a condition for participation in the cabinet, although they may appear on the party list for
reelection.
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This three-way coalition, known as the “Purple Coalition,” based on the com-
bination of the traditional red color of the PvdA and blue of the VVD, faced the
electorate in 1998 with a pledge to continue the coalition if the parties retained
sufficient strength to do so, thus reducing the potential “identifiability” problem
for voters. The coalition faced opposition not only from the Christian Democrats,
but also from a number of orthodox Calvinist parties,7 GroenLinks (literally, the
GreenLeft), the old-line Socialist Party, and a number of smaller parties focused on
particular issues.
In the elections that were held on May 6, 1998, the 150-seat Second Chamber
(lower house) of the national parliament was elected by party-list proportional rep-
resentation from a single constituency. The Netherlands provides for no minimum
threshold for party representation beyond the number of votes required to gain a
single seat (1/150th of the national tally). The only unusual feature of the list sys-
tem is a provision that voters may express a preference for one of the lower-ranked
candidates on the party list (Irwin 1999: 273–74).
The election was a moderate success for the coalition as a whole. Both Labor
and the Liberals gained seats (Labor gaining five percent of the vote and eight
more seats, bringing its total up to 45 seats; the Liberals gaining 4.8 percent and
seven seats, garnering 38 total seats), while D66 lost 6.5 percent of the vote relative
to 1994 and saw its seat total reduced from 24 in the outgoing parliament to 14.
Meanwhile, the Greensmore than doubled their representation to 11 seats (from 5),
the main opposition CDA again suffered losses, the Calvinist parties gained a seat,
7The Reformed Political Party (SGP), Reformed Political Union (GPV), and Reformed Political
Federation (RPF). These parties had separate lists in the election but generally attract support from
similar groups of voters.
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and the Socialists also attracted more votes, and received 5 seats. Although Labor
and the Liberals had sufficient seats between them (83 of 150) to form a minimal
winning coalition without D66, the latter party was invited into the new coalition
as well, under the continued leadership of Labor’s Wim Kok.
5.3 Hypotheses
To examine how retrospective evaluations of government performance were influ-
enced by respondents’ levels of sophistication, and in turn how vote choice was
affected by those evaluations, two separate estimation stages are necessary.
Duch, Palmer and Anderson (2000) estimate a model of retrospective evalu-
ations of government performance in the United States that includes sophistica-
tion effects.8 Adapting their hypotheses to the multiparty electoral context of the
Netherlands is reasonably straightforward.
Duch, Palmer and Anderson’s primary hypothesis is that party identification
conditions respondents’ evaluations of the performance of the government; those
citizens who identify with the party in power (in their case, that holding the Pres-
idency) will generally evaluate the government’s performance more highly than
those who do not do so. Outside the United States and other English-speaking
countries, however, the concept of “party identification” has met with limited suc-
cess (Budge, Crewe and Farlie 1976); for example, most voters in the Netherlands
do not identify with a particular party. Moreover, given the multiparty system
in the Netherlands, a unidimensional measure of party identification would be
8They also estimate a model of prospective evaluations; however, there are no prospective
evaluation questions in the 1998 Dutch Parliamentary Election Study.
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unsatisfactory.
As a substitute for “party identification,” we can use the affective orientation of
respondents to particular political parties. Because Dutch governments are typi-
cally coalitions, we would expect those voters who favor parties that are members
of the coalition to evaluate the government more highly, and those who favor the
parties outside the coalition to have less positive evaluations of the government’s
performance.
Another hypothesis is that the voter’s level of exposure to political information
will have an effect on their evaluations of government performance. In particular,
we would expect the voter’s level of education and level of political sophistication
to be generally more aware of the government’s performance, and thus “have
more accurate, or at least more consistent, economic evaluations” (Duch, Palmer
and Anderson 2000: 639).
We would also expect an interaction between these affective orientations and
the voter’s level of political sophistication. Duch, Palmer and Anderson argue,
based on Zaller (1992), that more politically sophisticated voters are more likely
to have their evaluations colored by partisan bias. In addition to this effect, more
sophisticated voters are more likely to understand the workings of a coalition
government—including its composition and the distribution of power among the
member parties—and thus are more likely to show an association between their
partisan affinities and their evaluations of government performance.
Finally, we would expect various manifestations of what Duch, Palmer and
Anderson describe as “group self-interest” to have an effect on evaluations. We
would expect the working class, the elderly, and women, groups who generally
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1. Higher income leads to more positive evaluations of the coalition.
2. More educated voters have more positive evaluations of the coalition.
3. Working-class voters have less positive evaluations of the coalition’s performance.
4. Voters with greater affinity for parties in the coalition will have more positive evalu-
ations of coalition performance.
5. The effect of affinity towards minor-party members of the coalition on evaluations
should be stronger among voters who are more politically sophisticated.
Table 3: Hypotheses tested in the model of evaluation formation.
benefitted from the policies previous, more egalitarian coalitions, to have negative
evaluations of the “neoliberal” Purple Coalition, and those citizens with higher
incomes to have more positive evaluations for similar reasons.
In addition to a model of retrospective evaluations, a second model of vote
choice is also necessary to decide whether the attributions of credit or blame for
past performance are translated at the voting booth. Recent studies of vote choice
in multiparty elections (Whitten and Palmer 1996; Alvarez and Nagler 1998, 2000;
Schofield et al. 1998; Quinn, Martin andWhitford 1999; andDuch and Palmer 2002)
suggest a number of hypotheses to be tested.
First and foremost, wewould expect the retrospective evaluation of government
performance to have an effect on vote choice. Voters who believe the government
is doing a good job should bemore likely to support coalition parties and less likely
to vote for opposition parties.
We might also expect an interaction between these evaluations and the respon-
dent’s level of sophistication, particularly among the parties outside the coalition;
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more sophisticated voters with negative evaluations of the government’s perfor-
mance should be more likely than nonsophisticates to support opposition parties
and less likely to vote for coalition members.
A number of control variables are also suggested by the literature. As the Dutch
party systemhashistorically been class-based,wewould expect class voting tohave
an effect on vote choice. We would also expect voters’ ideological orientations on
the left-right axis to have an effect, aswell as their issue positions and various effects
of “group self-interest” similar to those in the retrospective evaluation model.
Finally, we would expect religious devotion to have an effect, with those voters
who are more devout supporting the CDA or one of the minor Calvinist parties.
The hypotheses tested in the two models are shown in Tables 3 and 4.
5.4 Data and Methods
Thesehypotheses are examinedusingdata from the 1998DutchParliamentaryElec-
tion Study (Aarts, van der Kolk and Kamp 1999), a national face-to-face survey of
2101 potential voters in the Netherlands conducted prior to the 1998 parliamentary
elections.9
As described above, two separate models were estimated. The dependent vari-
able in the analysis of retrospective evaluation is a measure of the respondent’s
satisfaction with the government’s performance over the past four years (“Sat-
isfaction”). It is a composite of responses to three questions: the respondent’s
9Apost-electionwavewas also conducted; however, this analysis relies solely on the pre-election
wave.
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1. Thehistorical class-basedvotingpattern of theDutch electorate should lead to greater
support of the VVD and D66 among upper-class voters, higher support for the PvdA
amongworking-class voters, and higher support for the CDA amongmarried voters.
2. Left-wing ideology should increase support for the PvdA and Socialists, while right-
wing ideology should increase support for the VVD and minor Calvinist parties.
3. Voters who support greater income redistribution should support left-wing parties
more strongly.
4. Voters who favor euthanasia should be less likely to support the CDA and minor
Calvinist parties.
5. Respondents favoring more liberal asylum policies should be less supportive of the
VVD.
6. Voterswho favor greater European integration should be less supportive of thePvdA.
7. More religious voters should support the CDA and Calvinist parties.
8. Voters’ attitudes toward the performance of the coalition should affect their vote
choice, with voters who approve of coalition performance should be more likely to
vote for coalition members.
9. The preceding effect should be more pronounced among more sophisticated voters,
particularly when considering smaller coalition members.
Table 4: Hypotheses tested in the model of vote choice.
evaluation of the coalition’s “general performance,” the coalition’s impact on the
national economic situation, and the effect the coalition has had on unemployment.
Respondents’ attitudes toward the three coalition parties and the main opposi-
tion party (the CDA) were measured using four 0–100 “sympathy scales,” similar
to the feeling thermometers used in theAmericanNational Election Studies. As it is
possible that there were individual respondent effects in these attitudes, a separate
model was estimated with these sympathy scales recentered so the per-respondent
mean evaluation of the coalition parties, the CDA, GroenLinks, and the Socialists
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Variable Coded from
Satisfaction Four-point Mokken scale (H = 0.37) of three items
evaluating the performance of the government since the
1994 election, with 0 being the least satisfied and 3 being
the most satisfied. V0074.
General Performance Five-point Likert scale evaluating government performance
since the last election, with 1 meaning “very unsatisfied”
and 5 meaning “very satisfied.” V0073 (reversed).
Vote Choice A categorical measure of the respondent’s intended vote
in the 1998 Second Chamber elections. Respondents were
classified as planning a vote for CDA, D66, GroenLinks, a
Calvinist party (SGP, GPV, or RPF), PvdA, the Socialists, or
PvdA. Respondents who planned to vote for a minor party
or did not plan to vote were omitted. V0076.
Issue scales Respondent’s self-location the issues of income
redistribution, legalized euthanasia, asylum policy for
refugees, and further European integration. V0123, V0116,
V0130 and V0137 respectively.
Income Respondent’s estimated household income. V0348.
Age Respondent’s age. V0350.
Married Coded 1 for married respondents, 0 otherwise. V0351.
Education Respondent’s level of education. V0352.
Class Respondent’s self-identified social class. Omitted category
is middle class. V0394.
Left-Right Position Respondent’s self-location on an 11-point “left-right”
ideological spectrum. V0160.
Female Coded 1 for female respondents, 0 for males. V0288.
Catholic × Attendance Frequency of church attendance for Catholic respondents.
Coded 0 for non-Catholics. Coded from V0377 and V0382.
Protestant × Attendance Frequency of church attendance for Protestant respondents.
Coded 0 for non-Protestants. Coded from V0377 and
V0382.
Party Sympathy Scales Feeling thermometers: V0170 (Labour/PvdA), V0171
(VVD), V0172 (D66), and V0174 (CDA).
Adjusted Sympathy Scales The party sympathy scales, adjusted so the per-respondent
mean of the four included sympathy scales and the scales
for GroenLinks and the SP are zero.
Political Sophistication Latent variable constructed based “correct” answers to
44 knowledge items on the survey. The construction is
described further in the main text.
Table 5: Variables in the Dutch election models.
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was zero.10
The political sophistication measure used in this analysis was constructed from
a unidimensional item response theory model of political knowledge in the Dutch
electorate. For details on the theoretical justification for themodel and construction
of the measure, see the appendix starting on page 89.11
The coding for the group self-interest variables was straightforward and is
presented in Table 5. As the dependent variable has multiple ordered response
categories,12 the most appropriate estimator is an ordinal model such as ordered
logit13 or ordered probit (McKelvey and Zavoina 1975; Aldrich and Nelson 1984);
I chose to estimate it using the former specification.14 The model was estimated
in GNU R 1.7.1 (Ihaka and Gentleman 1996) using the polr (proportional-odds
logistic regression) procedure from the MASS library (Venables and Ripley 2002),
with only complete cases estimated.
The second specification uses as the dependent variable the respondent’s antic-
ipated vote choice. Respondents who indicated they planned to vote in the 1998
election were coded into one of seven categories, with those who did not plan to
vote or planned a vote for a minor party were omitted.
10GroenLinks and the Socialists were included to ensure the recentered sympathy scales would
not produce an identification problem in the model. Otherwise, each recentered scale would be
a linear function of the other three scales included, which would produce a singular estimation
matrix.
11A 13-point measure of political knowledge included in the public dataset performed similarly
in a previous analysis.
12Although this measure is has five categories, it effectively only has three due to most respon-
dents’ evaluations being clustered in the middle three points on the scale (and the model only
predicts three of the five responses). Estimating the model with the scale collapsed to three points
had no substantive effect.
13Also known as “proportional-odds logistic regression.”
14Probit estimates are generally equivalent to logit estimates, with a small scaling factor, except
in rare cases; see Long (1997) for a discussion.
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To operationalize “devoutness,” separate measures of church attendance for
Protestants and Catholics were produced. The operationalization of the remaining
hypotheses was straightforward (or already described above).
Two separate models using this specification are estimated; the first uses a
reversed “satisfaction” measure, which is the dependent variable in the retrospec-
tive evaluation models, while the second uses an reversed “general performance”
measure, one of the components of the satisfaction measure.15
As the dependent variable is categorical, a multinomial model is appropriate.
A number of potential models have been suggested in the literature, including
multinomial logit or MNL (Whitten and Palmer 1996), conditional logit (McFad-
den 1974), nested multinomial logit, mixed logit or MXL (Glasgow 2001), and
multinomial probit or MNP (Alvarez and Nagler 1998; Schofield et al. 1998; Quinn,
Martin and Whitford 1999), each of which has various benefits and drawbacks.16
Following Whitten and Palmer (1996), I used the MNL specification. The MNL
models were estimated in GNU R 1.8.0 with the vglm (vector generalized linear
model) procedure using the multinomial link in the VGAM package (Yee and Wild
1996).
A summary of variables in the models are presented in Table 5, and some
15The measures were reversed so that higher levels would indicate greater dissatisfaction with
the government’s performance, which eases interpretation of themodels, as most respondents were
generally satisfied.
16Mostnotably,MNL is subject to the “independenceof irrelevant alternatives” or IIAassumption.
However, alternative models generally must be estimated using simulation techniques likeMarkov
ChainMonte Carlo (MCMC), don’t allow individual-level variables (in the case of conditional logit),
require choice-specific variables to provide non-fragile estimates (Keane 1992), and/or generally are
notprovidedby commonstatistical packages; however, anR implementationofMNP is forthcoming
(Martin and Quinn 2003). Moreover, the degree to which the IIA assumption is problematic in
political science research is subject to some debate; see Whitten and Palmer (1996: 255–56) for a
discussion.
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descriptive statistics are provided for them in Tables 6–8. Table 8 also provides the
actual vote received by each party, from Irwin (1999).
5.5 Results
The results of estimating the model of retrospective evaluation appear in Tables 9
and 10.17 There are significant differences in the impact of sophistication on the
effects of attitudes toward the four parties. These differences are demonstrated
visually in effects displays showing the predicted impact of affect toward the
four largest political parties, conditioned on respondents’ levels of sophistication,
shown in Figures 5–8.18 For example, in Figure 6, an unsophisticated voter who
gave an evaluation of the VVD 50 points higher than the mean would only have
a 20% chance of awarding the coalition a “very high” evaluation, while a highly
sophisticated voter with the same rating of the VVD would have a 45% chance of
giving the coalition a “very high” satisfaction rating.
In addition, significance tests of the interactionbetween sophistication andparty
affect for the model using adjusted sympathy scales are shown in Table 11. This
table shows that more sophisticated voters are more likely to evaluate the coali-
tion’s performance on the basis of their affective orientation toward the member
17Unlike LIMDEP, but like Stata, polr estimates ordered logit models with k − 1 cut points and
the constant term (intercept) fixed at zero. There are no substantive effects; see Long (1997: 104) for
a discussion.
18Each effects display shows the predicted probability of a high evaluation of the coalition’s
performance for a “typical” voter who evaluates the given party at a particular “sympathy scale”
rating. In each display, the feeling thermometer ratings for the other three parties are held constant
at their means, and the remaining variables are set to their means or, in the case of dichotomous
variables, modes, while the adjusted rating for the party was allowed to vary from −50 to 50. The
panels show the estimated relationship for voterswhohave varying levels of political sophistication.
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Variable Range Median Mean Std. Dev.
Satisfaction 0–3 2 1.64 1.07
General performance 1–5 3 3.318 0.749
Income differences 1–7 5 4.96 1.57
Euthanasia 1–7 6 5.16 1.84
Asylum seekers 1–7 4 4.36 1.57
European integration 1–7 4 3.87 1.65
Left-Right position 0–10 5 5.10 2.07
Education 1–10 4 5.03 2.68
Income 1–12 9 8.01 3.27
Catholic × Attendance 0–4 0 0.42 0.96
Protestant × Attendance 0–4 0 0.43 1.15
PvdA sympathy scale 0–100 70 64.32 18.9
CDA sympathy scale 0–100 50 55.10 19.7
VVD sympathy scale 0–100 50 51.95 21.5
D66 sympathy scale 0–100 50 53.55 19.6
Political Sophistication 0–4.46 2.25 2.30 0.92
Table 6: Descriptive statistics for metric variables in the Dutch models.
Variable Percentage coded 1
Upper Class 17.4
Upper Working Class 7.2
Working Class 18.4
Female 51.4
Married 60.4
Table 7: Descriptive statistics for dummy-coded variables in the Dutch models.
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Percentage Support
Vote Choice Vote Intention (DPES) Election Results
PvdA (Labor) 27.8 29.0
VVD (Liberals) 22.8 24.7
CDA (Christian Democrats) 20.6 18.4
Democrats 66 7.4 9.0
GroenLinks (Greens) 8.5 7.3
SGP, GPV, RPF (Calvinists) 5.6 5.0
SP (Socialists) 5.3 3.5
Others (omitted) 2.0 3.1
Table 8: Descriptive statistics of intended vote choice in the 1998 DPES (with
comparison to the actual election results).
parties, particularly the junior members (the VVD and D66), while less sophisti-
cated voters show no effect of party affect toward coalition members; among the
least sophisticated voters, the only significant effect is in the opposite direction than
that which we would expect (CDA support among unsophisticated voters leads
to significantly higher evaluations of coalition performance, which is inconsistent
with “correct” retrospective evaluation).
The effect of sophistication on the relationship between attitudes toward Labour
(PvdA), the leading coalition partner, and coalition performance is the least pro-
nounced. At the lowest level of sophistication, there is a significant relationship
between ratings of Labour and the evaluation of coalition performance in the un-
adjusted model, while the effect is insignificant in the model using the adjusted
sympathy scores. There is a slight positive interaction (insignificant in the unad-
justed model, but significant in the adjusted model) between the level of sophisti-
cation and the feeling thermometer rating as illustrated in Figure 5. It is apparent
that almost all voters have learned that Labour is responsible for the government’s
performance, which is hardly surprising—not only was it the lead member of the
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Independent Variable Coefficient (Std. Err)
Income 0.038*(0.015)
Age −0.004(0.003)
Education 0.005(0.020)
Female −0.552***(0.093)
Working Class −0.386**(0.130)
Sophistication −0.260(0.252)
PvdA Sympathy 0.016*(0.007)
VVD Sympathy −0.006(0.007)
D66 Sympathy −0.008(0.008)
CDA Sympathy 0.022**(0.007)
Sophistication × PvdA Symp. 0.003(0.003)
Sophistication × VVD Symp. 0.007*(0.003)
Sophistication × D66 Symp. 0.008**(0.003)
Sophistication × CDA Symp. −0.009**(0.003)
µ1
0.260
(0.644)
µ2
1.540*
(0.646)
µ3
3.002***
(0.649)
Log likelihood (L) −2232.970
Wald test versus null model χ2(14) 1309.383***
Percent correctly classified 40.37%
Proportional reduction in error over null model 14.63%
• Coefficients are ordered logit maximum-likelihood estimates. N = 1761.
• *** indicates Pr(t) < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, † p < .10 (two-tailed test).
Table 9: Ordered logit model of voter satisfaction with the 1994–98 Dutch govern-
ment’s performance using unadjusted sympathy scales.
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Independent Variable Coefficient (Std. Err)
Income 0.045**(0.015)
Age −0.008**(0.003)
Education 0.007(0.020)
Female −0.538***(0.093)
Working Class −0.393**(0.129)
Sophistication 0.241***(0.070)
Adj. PvdA Sympathy 0.014(0.009)
Adj. VVD Sympathy −0.004(0.007)
Adj. D66 Sympathy −0.009(0.010)
Adj. CDA Sympathy 0.019*(0.008)
Sophistication × PvdA Symp. 0.007†(0.004)
Sophistication × VVD Symp. 0.005†(0.003)
Sophistication × D66 Symp. 0.012**(0.004)
Sophistication × CDA Symp. −0.007*(0.003)
µ1
−1.055***
(0.249)
µ2
0.186
(0.247)
µ3
1.606***
(0.250)
Log likelihood (L) −2271.095
Wald test versus null model χ2(14) 1233.132***
Percent correctly classified 37.54%
Proportional reduction in error over null model 10.57%
• Coefficients are ordered logit maximum-likelihood estimates. N = 1761.
• *** indicates Pr(t) < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, † p < .10 (two-tailed test).
Table 10: Ordered logit model of voter satisfaction with the 1994–98 Dutch gov-
ernment’s performance using adjusted sympathy scales.
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t score at level of sophistication
Party Baseline (0%) 25% Median (50%) 75% Maximum (100%)
PvdA 1.586 6.334*** 8.711*** 7.869*** 4.861***
VVD −0.559 1.248 2.908* 4.086*** 3.094**
D66 −0.927 2.182* 4.887*** 6.454*** 4.968***
CDA 2.327* 1.855† 0.922 −0.905 −2.055*
• Table entries are t tests of the linear hypothesis βi + β js = 0, where βi is the coefficient
for the party’s sympathy scale, β j is the coefficient for the interaction of the sympathy
scale and sophistication, and s is the corresponding value of sophistication. The first
column corresponds to the baseline significance tests presented alongwith themodel.
• The t tests are formulated as t = bi+b js√
σ2bi
+s2σ2bj
+2sσbibj
.
• *** indicates Pr(t) < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, † p < .10 (two-tailed test).
Table 11: The effects of interactions between sophistication and adjusted party
sympathy scales.
coalition, it was also the only member of the coalition that had been continuously
in government since the 1989 election.
The impact of sophistication among the two junior coalition partners (VVD and
D66) is more interesting. Attitudes toward both parties have small, insignificant
effects among unsophisticated voters, but both interactions show significant, pos-
itive relationships at higher levels of knowledge in both models. Figures 6 and
7 illustrate this increasing slope at higher levels of sophistication, indicating that
more knowledgeable voters tend to have a higher level of understanding about the
smaller parties’ role in political decision-making, while the relationship appears to
be less strong among less sophisticated voters.
Finally, the effect of evaluations of the CDA varies markedly between unsophis-
ticated and sophisticated voters. Unsophisticated voters appear completely oblivious
to the upheaval in theDutch system in 1994, and are still using their feelings toward
75
Adjusted sympathy scale for PvdA
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Figure 5: The impact of political sophistication on the use of affect toward Labour
(PvdA) as a heuristic for evaluating coalition performance.
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Adjusted sympathy scale for VVD
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Figure 6: The impact of political sophistication on the use of affect toward the VVD
as a heuristic for evaluating coalition performance.
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Adjusted sympathy scale for D66
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Figure 7: The impact of political sophistication on the use of affect toward D66 as
a heuristic for evaluating coalition performance.
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Adjusted sympathy scale for CDA
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Figure 8: The impact of political sophistication on the use of affect toward the CDA
as a heuristic for evaluating coalition performance.
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the CDA to evaluate the performance of the government (this is illustrated by the
significant, positive relationship on the non-interactive term in the models, and the
positive slope in the upper-left corner of Figure 8). However, the significant, nega-
tive coefficient on the interaction reverses this effect among the most sophisticated
voters, suggesting that there is a partisan bias in attributions of coalition perfor-
mance among themost sophisticated voters—that is, that sophisticated voters with
higher evaluations of the CDA are less likely to show high levels of support for the
coalition’s performance, indicating that their partisanship affects the objectivity of
their evaluations.19
Another noteworthy effect is that theuse of affect towardparties ismore strongly
associated with evaluations of coalition performance among more sophisticated
voters. Although it is not readily apparent from the coefficients, the figures clearly
show that party affect is strongly associated with intensity of opinion about the
coalition’s performance among sophisticates, while less sophisticated voters are
less likely to have a strongly positive opinion about the government.
The effects of the control variables are generally as expected. Women and the
working class generally have less favorable evaluations of the government’s perfor-
mance (female voters are approximately 42% less likely to have a high evaluation
of the coalition’s performance, while working-class voters are 32% less likely to
evaluate the coalition’s performance highly), while those with higher incomes gen-
erally have more favorable evaluations, indicating that the “neoliberal” leanings of
19There is a slight, but significant, negative correlation between the adjusted sympathy scores
for PvdA and the CDA among voters at all levels of sophistication; no such correlation is apparent
when using the unadjusted scores.
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the coalition resonated with voters with higher incomes (a one-unit increase in in-
come increased the odds of higher support for the coalition’s performance by 4%).
The effect of age was small, although it attained significance in the model with the
adjusted sympathy measure, with a ten-year increase in age corresponding to an
8% drop in support for the coalition; however, the effect of age was not statistically
significant in the model with the unadjusted measure. Information had little effect
in the unadjusted model; however, in the adjusted model, sophisticates were 27%
more likely to have a positive evaluation of the government than nonsophisticates,
and the effect was statistically significant.
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The results of the multinomial logit models of vote choice are presented in Ta-
bles 12 and 13. In terms of retrospective evaluation, themost interesting coefficients
are the “dissatisfaction” and “poor performance” measures, and their interactions
with sophistication. In both models, retrospective evaluations make no difference
in vote choice among the least sophisticated voters; however, among sophisticates,
dissatisfied voters’ likelihood of choosing the CDA over PvdA is significantly
higher in both models. The general performance measure performs substantially
better than the aggregated “satisfaction” measure among sophisticates; in addition
to the CDA, both the Greens and Socialists benefit from negative assessments of
government performance—but only among sophisticated voters. In addition, the
Calvinists are more likely to be supported over PvdA among moderately sophisti-
cated voters with negative evaluations of the coalition’s performance.
These interactions for the general performance model at varying levels of so-
phistication are shown further in Table 14; this table indicates there is essentially no
significant relationship between performance evaluations and vote choice among
the least sophisticated voters, while there is a statistically significant relationship at
higher levels of sophistication. In addition, Figure 9 shows the effects of coalition
performance evaluations on the predicted probability of voting for PvdA (the lead
coalition member), the CDA (the largest opposition party), and Democrats 66 (the
smallest coalitionmember) among less sophisticated voters, while Figure 10 shows
these effects among more sophisticated voters.20
20In each figure, the control variables are set to their mean (or, in the case of dichotomous
variables, the mode). The low sophistication graph shows voters at the 25th percentile, while the
high sophistication graph shows voters at the 75th percentile. On the horizontal axis, the “general
performance” measure is varied across its observed range, while the vertical axis is the predicted
probability of an individual voter planning a vote for the party in question.
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t score at level of sophistication
log(Party)/log(PvdA) Baseline (0%) 25% Median (50%) 75% Maximum (100%)
CDA −1.431 0.637 2.639* 4.387*** 3.893***
Democrats 66 0.558 1.006 1.287 1.195 0.443
GroenLinks −0.666 1.081 2.657* 4.251*** 3.458**
Calvinists 1.297 2.391* 3.050** 2.668* 0.962
Socialists 0.287 2.914** 4.985*** 6.322*** 4.321***
VVD −0.195 0.641 1.382 1.796† 1.323
• Table entries are t tests of the linear hypothesis βi + β js = 0, where βi is the coefficient
for the party’s sympathy scale, β j is the coefficient for the interaction of the sympathy
scale and sophistication, and s is the corresponding value of sophistication. The first
column corresponds to the baseline significance tests presented alongwith themodel.
• The t tests are formulated as t = bi+b js√
σ2bi
+s2σ2bj
+2sσbibj
.
• *** indicates Pr(t) < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, † p < .10 (two-tailed test).
Table 14: The effects of interactions between sophistication and general perfor-
mance.
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Figure 9: The effect of government performance evaluations on predicted proba-
bility of vote choice among less sophisticated voters.
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Figure 10: The effect of government performance evaluations on predicted proba-
bility of vote choice among more sophisticated voters.
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In addition to these effects, a number of effects among the control variables are
also of interest. Older voters are less likely to support newer parties than younger
ones (for example, a ten-year increase in age corresponds to a 33% drop in the odds
of supporting the Greens over the PvdA), while the probability of married voters
supporting theCDAover thePvdA is significantlyhigher than forunmarriedvoters
(being married increases the relative odds of supporting the CDA over the PvdA
by 92%). The class, confessional, and ideological bases of support for each party
are also apparent, as is the impact of issue positions.21 The only control variable
that has no effect is household income; its substantial effects may be captured by
the social class dummy variables.
5.6 Conclusions
This chapter has examined whether voters of varying levels of political sophistica-
tion can use their attitudes toward political parties to make facially valid assess-
ments of the performance of a coalition government, and to use those assessments
to guide vote choice. The evidence for low-information rationality is decidedly
mixed: while less sophisticated voters were able to correctly attribute coalition
performance based on their feelings toward the Labour party, they were unable to
do so with either the VVD or D66, the smaller coalition partners, and many still
were evaluating the government’s performance based on their attitudes toward
the CDA—which had not been part of the government in four years. In general,
sophisticated voters did much better, although they did display some degree of
21For example, upper-class voters are 107% more likely to support the VVD over the PvdA than
middle-class voters, while working-class voters are 67% less likely to support the CDA over the
PvdA (and are 93% less likely to support the VVD over the PvdA) than are middle-class voters.
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attribution bias at the highest levels of sophistication.
The voting models also demonstrate heterogeneity in attribution of responsi-
bility. Less sophisticated voters generally do not appear to make their vote choice
based on retrospective evaluations of the parties’ performance, while more so-
phisticated voters are more likely to defect from their “natural” preferences to an
opposition party if they are dissatisfied with the government’s performance. This
finding suggests that volatility in election results in Holland is largely driven by
sophisticated voters who behave as if the system is pluralistic, while nonsophisti-
cates generally respond to elections as if they were a “class census,” as we would
expect them to in a “consensus democracy” like the Netherlands.
The results suggest that clarity of responsibility matters, but perhaps in a more
subtle fashion than we might have thought. In particular, it begs the question
whether similar effects are present in other polities that have recently seen a dra-
matic shift in the relative strengthsofparties, suchas fellow“consensusdemocracy”
Austria and majoritarian Britain. Could some of the Conservative Party’s woes in
Britain be partially due to unsophisticated voters still thinking the Tories are at
least partially responsible for government policies? Could the Austrian People’s
Party still be benefitting from voters who don’t know they are in the government?
Finally, it is possible that different coalition sizes or compositions may make a
difference in attributions; in this case, only the lead party (PvdA) received blame or
credit among most voters, despite the fact that the second-largest party (the VVD)
held an equal number of cabinet seats and nearly as many seats in the Second
Chamber. Is it solely the prime minister’s party that receives blame, or is this an
artifact of the VVD leader’s unusual oppositional role during the 1994–98 coalition?
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Would it make a difference if the prime minister came from a minority partner in
the coalition, as is sometimes the case in coalitions? What if the coalition had
more members, or just included two parties? Expanding this analysis to multiple
coalitions, or perhaps including additional countries, would help to answer these
questions.
5.7 Appendix: The measure of political sophistication
Unlike the American National Election Studies, the Dutch Parliamentary Election
Studies do not include an interviewer evaluation of the respondent’s level of politi-
cal knowledge, themeasure used in the other two data analyses in this dissertation.
Therefore, it was necessary to select a measure based on the responses to the ques-
tions in the survey.
Fortunately, the 1998 DPES includes a number of knowledge measures that
could reasonably be considered for use as a measure of a respondent’s overall
political sophistication. Three measures constructed by the DPES investigators
were available. The simplest measure was a dummy variable indicating whether
or not the respondent correctly identified the composition of the outgoing coalition
based on a series of 14 questions asking the respondent to identify whether or not
a particular party was a coalition member.22 Approximately 63.4% of the sample
was able to identify all of the parties correctly (and not give any incorrect answers).
The other two measures were based on identification of four domestic Dutch
22Of these questions, 13 prompted the respondent to say whether or not a named party was in
the coalition, while the final question asked the respondent if she could identify any other party in
the coalition.
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Measure Description Variable
Coalition knowledge Correct identification of the
coalition members from a
14-question series.
V0224
Identification #1 Mokken scale based on the
number of questions answered
correctly in a quiz based on
photos of four Dutch political
figures (H = 0.62).
V0202
Identification #2 How many of the four Dutch
political figures were identified
completely correctly (H = 0.63).
V0203
Table 15: Sophistication measures included in the 1998 DPES
political leaders from photographs. Respondents were called on to give the name,
party affiliation, and job description of four important members of the lower house
(Second Chamber) of the Dutch parliament, thus giving a total of twelve questions.
The first measure is based on the number of responses that were correct, while the
second is based on the number of leaders who were completely correctly identi-
fied (i.e. all three items pertaining to that leader were answered correctly). The
measures are briefly summarized in Table 15.
However, the 1998 DPES also included a number of other knowledge items.
Rather than relying on the relatively small set of knowledge items embodied in the
three measures provided in the DPES, I identified all of the potential knowledge
items in the pre-election DPES wave and constructed an item-response theory model
of political sophistication for the Dutch electorate.23
23This is not new application of this class of models; Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996) apply an
item-response theorymodel to items of political knowledge in an appendix to their book. However,
they applied it strictly to direct knowledge items; the present model also includes “differentiation”
items patterned after those suggested by Luskin (1990). (I actually arrived at this application of
the model independently of Delli Carpini and Keeter, as the other literature using item-response
theory models in political science did not take note of their use of the model.)
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5.7.1 Knowledge Items
The pre-election wave of the 1998 DPES included 45 knowledge items, 44 of which
I used in the item-response theory model.24 In addition to the 12 picture identifica-
tion items and 13 coalition composition questions, 19 other items were believed to
be indicators of the respondent’s level of political sophistication. Ten items were
included that asked respondents to identify whether or not ten countries were
members of the European Union at the time of the survey.25 Four items asked
respondents to identify the relative sizes of four pairs of party delegations in the
Second Chamber.
The final five items were constructed similarly to Luskin (1990)’s Dmeasure of
political differentiation or Zaller (1990)’s “information scale.” Respondents were
asked to place themselves and six parties (PvdA, CDA, VVD,D66, GroenLinks, and
GPV) on seven-point issue scales on the followingfive issues: euthanasia, rectifying
income differences, asylum policy, increasing integration of the European Union,
and the degree of integration of ethnic minorities into Dutch society. Respondents
were scored as correct if they correctly identified the relative positions of the most
extreme parties on each issue and placed themselves on the issue scale.
All 44 items, which are presented in Table 16 were coded as dichotomous
variables, with missing values set to zero,26 for estimation as the X matrix in the
24The omitted item was the open-ended question asking respondents to identify another party
that was in the coalition; only two respondents identified another party, so the question was
essentially useless.
25The countries were Germany, the United States*, France, Italy, Spain, Poland*, Lithuania*,
Sweden, Norway*, and Turkey*. (Countries marked with an asterisk were not EU members at the
time of the survey.)
26The missing values were originally treated as missing data. However, most of these items
include “don’t know” responses as the overwhelmingmajority of themissing data; therefore coding
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Measure Description Variables
Policy Issue Positions Correct identification of the
relative positions of the most
extreme parties on five issues.
From V0110–V0144
EU Members Correct identification of whether
10 countries were members of the
European Union.
V0150–V0159
Politician IDs Correct identification of the
name, party affiliation, and
position of four politicians.
V0190–V0201
Party Sizes Correct identification of the
relative sizes of four pairs of
political parties in Parliament.
V0205–V0208
Coalition Members Correct identification of members
and non-members of the 1994-98
coalition government.
V0210-V0222
Table 16: Knowledge items in the item-response theory model
item-response theory model described below.
5.7.2 Item-Response Theory Models
The concept of an item-response theorymodel comes from the fields of psychomet-
rics and educational testing, where there is an interest in deciding how well items
on examinations measure latent traits. For example, wemight be interested in how
well a multiple-choice examination of undergraduates reflects their mastery of the
material in the course. In the item-response theory literature, this latent trait is
called an ability, and each item on the test is believed to be an (imperfect) indicator
thesemissing responses as “incorrect” ismore accurate thanmerely treating them asmissing, which
would vastly overestimate the possibility that the missing response was a result of something other
than not knowing the correct answer. This is particularly apparent on the political figure knowledge
questions, where hundreds of respondents gave “don’t know” responses that almost certainly reflect
true ignorance.
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of the latent ability of each subject.27
In the political science literature, the most famous application of item-response
theory is to the analysis of legislative roll call data. Poole and Rosenthal (1997), for
example, apply a variant of thismodel (which they callNOMINATE) to estimate the
ideal points for legislators in a two-dimensional Euclidean space. More recently, the
availability of high-speed desktop computers has provided the ability to estimate
item-response theorymodelswith less restrictive assumptions usingMarkovChain
Monte Carlo (MCMC) procedures, generally using the Bayesian framework for
statistical analysis.
Specifically, Johnson andAlbert (1999) describe a tractable item-response theory
model.28 Assume each subject j has a latent ability (ideal point) θ j and each item i
has two parameters: a difficulty denoted αi (how “hard” the question is—ameasure
of how likely a randomly-selected subject is to get it correct) and a discrimination
parameter denoted βi (how well the question distinguishes between subjects with
varying levels of the latent trait). Then we can define zi j, the probability that the
observed response xi j is correct, as:
zi j = αi + β′jθ j + i j
27The relationship between this procedure and factor analysis should be readily apparent; the
main distinction is that the observed variables (test items) are dichotomous and that the estimation
procedure can recover more than one item-specific measure of the item’s efficacy.
28The model is generalizable to multiple dimensions: for a description and application to the
legislator ideal-points problem, see Jackman (2001). For notational convenience, and because the
unidimensional case is the only one used here, I simplify slightly and assume there is only one
latent trait. I follow the notation used by Jackman and Martin and Quinn (2003), who chose the
parameterization β = a and α = b, contra Johnson and Albert, which corresponds more clearly to
statistical parlance (where α is an intercept and β is a slope) but leads to a great deal of confusion
when switching between the two notations.
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We cannot observe this probability directly; however, we can treat zi j as an
unobserved utility, and use a random utility approach (as in the standard probit
and logit models):
Pr(xi j = 1|θ j) = F(zi j)
Generally, F is the standard normal cumulative density function (Φ). With
suitable priors and constraints on the distribution of α and β (namely, that they
are distributed normally with a mean of zero and a precision29 of one), the model
is identified sufficiently to produce a solution.30 The MCMCpack package for GNU
R (Martin and Quinn 2003) provides a C++ procedure (MCMCirtKd) for estimating
this two-parameter item-response theory model with a specified number of latent
abilities.31
5.7.3 Estimation and Results
As the 44 items were expected to represent a single latent trait, “political so-
phistication,” a unidimensional item-response theory model was estimated using
MCMCirtKd, and the mean estimated ability (θ¯ j) for each respondent was stored.
To simplify interpretation of the model presented in the body of the chapter, the
measure was recentered so the zero point was at the 2.5 percentile, and subjects
whose abilities were estimated to be below the zero point were moved to the zero
29In the Bayesian framework, precisions are used instead of variances. The precision is simply
the reciprocal of the variance.
30Itmay also behelpful to identify the sign of one of the βparameters to constrain thedirectionality
of the recovered latent factor, for ease of interpretation.
31A second procedure, MCMCirt1d, is available that allows subject-specific constraints, but is
restricted to a single dimension and has slightly different assumed priors.
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Item α β Item α β
Germany in EU 2.165 0.927 PvdA > VVD 1.188 0.642
USA not in EU 1.737 0.793 D66 > GroenLinks 1.196 0.504
France in EU 1.798 0.802 CDA < PvdA 0.965 0.713
Italy in EU 1.178 0.649 VVD > D66 1.213 0.648
Spain in EU 1.161 0.581 PvdA in coal. 2.300 1.373
Poland not in EU 0.937 0.369 CDA not in coal. 0.853 1.462
Lithuania not in EU 1.601 0.588 VVD in coal. 1.414 1.053
Sweden in EU −0.007 0.105 D66 in coal. 1.392 1.356
Norway not in EU −0.069 0.151 GroenLinks not in coal. 1.917 1.234
Turkey not in EU 0.797 0.215 SGP not in coal. 4.213 2.412
Wallage/Name −0.435 1.300 GPV not in coal. 4.862 2.912
Wallage/Party 0.113 1.614 RPF not in coal. 4.766 2.775
Wallage/Pos −1.043 1.652 CD not in coal. 4.379 2.588
de Graaf/Name −0.867 1.635 Unie 55+ not in coal. 4.502 2.557
de Graaf/Party −0.537 1.784 AOV not in coal. 4.253 2.408
de Graaf/Pos −1.059 1.502 SP not in coal. 4.125 2.464
Jorritsma/Name 0.415 0.612 Senioren 2000 not in coal. 3.207 1.717
Jorritsma/Party 0.327 1.309 Euthanasia issue 0.402 0.764
Jorritsma/Pos 0.863 0.831 Income differences 0.686 0.811
Bukman/Name −1.112 1.340 Asylum seekers 0.572 0.794
Bukman/Party −0.709 1.423 EU unification −0.521 0.538
Bukman/Pos −0.682 1.469 Minority integration 0.240 0.749
Table 17: Parameters of the item-response theory model
point.
Mean αi (difficulty) and βi (discrimination) parameters for each item were also
recovered, and are presented in Table 17. The α parameters are more negative for
“harder” items; generally, they are correlated with the percentage of the subjects
who got a particular response “correct.” The β parameters are all positive in this
analysis because higher levels of the latent trait are associated with higher levels
of the observed items; this is not necessarily the case for ideal-point estimates,
where the “correctness” of a particular item (e.g. a roll call vote) is a function of
the underlying partisan directionality of the vote.
Generally, it appears that the photo identification questions were the hardest,
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although respondents also had trouble figuring out which Scandinavian country
was a member of the European Union and had some difficulty identifying the
relative positions of the extreme parties on the five issues considered in the survey.
Respondents also had difficulty with the questions that looked at the relative size
of the CDA versus PvdA (the former of which had suffered a landslide loss in the
1994 elections, reversing the historic positions of the two parties) and that required
respondents to know that the CDA was no longer part of the government.
The findings generally indicate that the 13-point knowledge scale based on the
four politicians’ photos would perform fairly well as a measure of sophistication,
as the items had both good variation in their difficulties and fairly strong discrim-
ination parameters. However, the full measure of sophistication recovered from
this analysis had higher variation, included additional items that would indicate
voter sophistication (most notably the issue items), and is closer to a true metric
scale, so it was used in the main analysis.
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CHAPTER VI
DUVERGER’S LAW, POLITICAL SOPHISTICATION
AND STRATEGIC VOTING
It’s true, we are aliens. But what are you
going to do about it? It’s a two-party system;
you have to vote for one of us.
— “Kodos” in “Treehouse of Horror VII,” The
Simpsons (Keeler, Greaney and Cohen 1996).
One of the best-known and durable theories of political institutions is that the
use of plurality elections leads to the evolution of a two-party system. Although
this theory existed prior to Maurice Duverger’s statement of it (see Riker 1982b for
a historical overview), his statement of “Duverger’s Law” and explanation that it
is the result of both mechanical and psychological consequences of the institution
of plurality elections is the best-known articulation of the idea. This chapter is
concerned mostly with the latter, including the broader concept of strategic voting,
and the capacity within the electorate to engage in it.1
Although minor parties have played a relatively marginal role in much of
American history, with the exception of the ascension of the Republican Party to
major-party status in the civil war period, presidential candidates of minor parties
have had a pivotal role in many recent presidential elections. In the past three
presidential elections (1992, 1996 and 2000), minor party candidates robbed the
1Also known as “tactical,” “sophisticated,” or “insincere” voting.
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plurality winner of an absolute majority of the popular vote, and in the most recent
election a number of candidates received sufficient votes to decide the disposition
of Florida’s electors, despite their relatively paltry vote shares. Thus, clearly some
segment of the electorate chose to express a “sincere” vote for minor candidates,
even though that choice may have diminished the chances of their next-most-
preferred candidate in the election. Why do some voters choose to vote sincerely,
while others choose a strategic vote?
In this chapter, I focus on the decision whether or not to support major-party
candidates in the 1992, 1996 and 2000 presidential voters. For some voters, this
was a sincere choice, while some others may have preferred third-party candidates
but chose to vote strategically in an attempt to block the election of their least
preferred major-party candidate. I show that voters who were predisposed to vote
for a third-party candidate and in a state where the election was generally viewed
as close (the so-called “battleground” states) were more likely to make a strategic
choice, while voters in non-battleground states were more likely to vote sincerely.
This effect, which I term conditional strategic behavior, was stronger among those
voters who displayed higher levels of political sophistication.
6.1 Literature Review
As discussed above, the existence of Duverger’s Law precedes Duverger himself.
Riker (1982b) traces its evolution to the 19th century, noting that Henry Droop was
the first to make a concise statement of the law, in 1881, 70 years prior to Duverger,
and that the law as “commonplace” knowledge by 1901 (756). Duverger, however,
did discuss the concept in greater detail than previous works, and concluded
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that both “mechanical” and “psychological” factors caused minor parties to fail
to gain support in plurality systems. The “mechanical” effect is mostly one of
disproportionality; parties need only receive a plurality of the vote to gain a whole
seat in a legislature, so it is possible for a party to gain a majority position in the
legislature while only receiving a minority of the popular vote, even independent
of factors such as gerrymandering (Taagepera and Shugart 1989, 1993).
The “psychological” effect is perhapsmore interesting, and the subject of greater
controversy. Downs (1957) built on Duverger’s Law to suggest the following:
A rational voter first decides what party he believes will benefit him
most; then he tries to estimate whether this party has any chance of
winning. He does this because his vote should be expended as part of
a selection process, not as an expression of preference. Hence even if
he prefers part A, he is “wasting” his vote on A if it has no chance of
winning, because very few other voters prefer it to B or C. The relevant
choice in this case is between B and C. Since a vote for A is not useful in
the actual process of selection, casting it is irrational (48).
Thus, to the extent voters are rational, they should vote strategically. Riker, in
reviewing the extant literature at the time, generally found that “a large amount
of sophisticated voting occurs—mostly to the disadvantage of the third parties
nationally—so that the force of Duverger’s psychological factor must be consid-
erable” (764). More recent behavioral studies in various countries (Alvarez and
Nagler 1998, 2000; Duch and Palmer 2002; Wantchekon 1999) have generally ar-
rived at similar conclusions, although researchers studying Canada (Bowler and
Lanoue 1992; Gaines 1999; Blais 2002) have found surprisingly little strategic voting
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there, perhaps due to stronger distinctions between Canadian parties than their
counterparts in other countries and the heterogeneity of party systems between
provinces.
However, formal models of voting, focusing on parties and candidates as the
strategic actors, have met with mixed success (Cox 1997; Feddersen 1992; Palfrey
1989), and individual-level models have scarcely fared better, with Ferejohn and
Fiorina (1974) suggesting that strategic voting is, contraDowns, irrational, although
Fey (1997) suggests a model that accounts for the strategic behavior of voters in
response to polling data, and Bueno de Mesquita (2000) suggests in his study
of Israel’s 1990s experiment with separate, direct election of the prime minister
that political actors account for strategic behavior by voters in decisions about the
electoral laws they implement (and the aggregate outcomes suggest that voters for
minor parties did, in fact, react strategically to the introduction of direct election of
the prime minister).
Most interest in strategic voting in the United States has focused on the primary
process (Bartels 1985, 1988; Southwell 1991; Abramson et al. 1992), where the op-
portunities for strategic voting are more apparent and the candidates are generally
better substitutes for each other. There has also been some interest in the incidence
of strategic voting in terms of bloc voting against minority candidates (see e.g.
Liu 2001). Explanations of strategic voting in presidential elections have been less
widespread.
Most explanations of voting for minor-party candidates have focused on fac-
tors other than strategic considerations. One common theme has been that of
disaffection and distrust of the political system: voters are more likely to support
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third-party candidates due to feeling alienated from the major parties. Peterson
andWrighton (1998) and Southwell (2003) both suggest that this is a primary cause
of voting for minor candidates. However, Koch (2003) indicates that support for
third-party candidates leads to these feelings of distrust and disaffection, and that
for explanations of support for minor candidates we should look to the same ex-
planations as those for support of major-party candidates. Other explanations
have focused on issue-based “protest” voting motivated by the alleged failures
of the two major parties on policy grounds (Rosenstone, Behr and Lazarus 1996);
Donovan, Bowler and Terrio (2000) find some support for this thesis in a study of
California third-party voters.2
Abramson et al. (1995), rather than attempting to explain support for third-party
candidates George Wallace, John Anderson, and Ross Perot, examine the relative
feeling thermometer evaluations of candidates in their respective elections and
suggest that most of the failure of the minor candidates to win votes was a result
of the mechanical features of Duverger’s Law, rather than a psychological effect,
although they find a drop-off effect in the support for all three minor candidates.
In a similar vein, McCann, Rapoport and Stone (1999) find a drop-off in support for
Perot before and after the campaign, although this effect was less marked among
those who were more active Perot supporters in their sample.
2The difference between protest voting and more general disaffection is not necessarily very
clear-cut; however, generally protest voting is believed to be motivated by particular issues (for
example, the budget deficit in Ross Perot’s 1992 campaign), while disaffection appears to be a more
long-term phenomenon and less focused on particular issues than on failures of either the major
parties or government in general.
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6.2 Theory
If we assume that voters have transitive preferences, they will have a (possibly
incomplete) rank-ordering of potential vote recipients. For example, in a four-
candidate race, we can assume that a voter will rank at least some of those candi-
dates in some order based on her preferences.3 A voter is sincere if she votes for her
most highly-ranked candidate; otherwise, the voter is insincere. We can consider
a voter strategic if she votes for a candidate who will reduce the probability of a
less-preferred candidate being elected. And, a voter’s choice is pivotal if a change
in their vote would change the outcome of the election.
Formost voters, strategic voting is unnecessary. Voterswho support a candidate
who has a serious chance of winning will not find themselves in a situation where
they must decide whether or not they will vote strategically—or, more accurately,
their strategic choice is also the sincere choice, as a sincere vote for their preferred
candidate will also accomplish the strategic goal of reducing the chances of a less
preferred candidate taking office.
However, supporters of minor-party candidates and disaffected supporters of
the major parties have to decide between voting sincerely and making a strategic
choice. Voting for a candidate unlikely to win the election will have virtually no
effect on the chances of each of the major candidates winning; thus, this sincere
choice can be said to have no impact on the election—essentially having the same
effect as abstaining. The voter can instead make a strategic and insincere choice by
voting for one of the candidates with a chance of winning the election, which will
3The voter need not rank all candidates; she could simply rank one candidate above all the
others.
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reduce the chances of the other contending candidates.4
For these supporters, the strategic/sincere choice rests on whether their vote is
likely to be pivotal. AlthoughDowns (1957) argues that casting a non-strategic vote
is irrational, that is only the case if the vote has a non-negligible chance of affect-
ing the outcome of the election. Sincere voting for minor candidates is irrational
in the sense that elections are not normally thought of as a forum for expressing
general preferences, but rather as a “selection process”; however, if political actors
respond to election results as if they are referenda on particular policies espoused
by candidates, sincere voting for minor candidates may be rational in certain cir-
cumstances.5 If a citizen’s vote is almost certainly not pivotal, it may be rational for
voters to show their public policy preferences by supporting a minor candidate.6
In the United States, the use of the Electoral College to elect the president
creates an electoral environment in which voters will have varying incentives to
engage in strategic voting. The use of the Electoral College means that presidential
candidates compete in 51 separate elections7 to gain electors, rather than a single
4A voter could also vote insincerely, but not strategically, by voting for a candidate who is
less preferred than their favorite candidate, but who will not reduce the probability of their least
preferred candidate winning the election. This sort of voting behavior appears to be irrational, but
could conceivably occur.
5For example, many politicians responded to the large percentage of the vote for Ross Perot in
1992 by attempting to balance the federal budget, while large votes for reformist andpro-temperance
minor candidates in the late 19th and early 20th centuries encouraged politicians to enact a number
of substantial political reforms and Prohibition.
6See e.g. Riker and Ordeshook (1968), Fiorina (1976), and Riker (1982a) who argued that voting
should be seen as both “selection processes” and “referenda.”
7There are votes to select electors in all 50 states and an election in the District of Columbia for its
three electors. As a simplifying assumption, Maine and Montana—states that choose some of their
electors at the congressional district level, rather than at-large—are treated as having statewide
at-large elections. For a recent discussion of the impact of the Electoral College on presidential
election outcomes, see Neubauer and Zeitlin (2003).
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nationwide contest.8 As electors are selected on a per-state basis on an essentially
at-large basis, and states have varying levels of support for the two major parties,
the competitiveness of the election in each state is a function both of the relative
popularity of the candidates in the electorate at large and the partisan dispositions
of the electorate in a particular state.
Thus, voters may be considered rational if they express a preference, rather
than merely taking part in a “selection process,” in states where their vote is
highly unlikely to make a difference in the outcome. For example, according
to CNN (2000), only 20 of the 51 elections for electors in 2000 were in so-called
“battleground” states that were expected to be close.9 Thus, a voter in one of
the other 30 states or the District of Columbia could presumably vote for a third-
party candidate and thus have virtually no expectation of affecting the presidential
contest, as their vote would be highly unlikely to affect the disposition of their
state’s electors.10
Moreover,minor-party supporterswithhigher levels of knowledgeaboutAmer-
ican politics—those who are more politically sophisticated (Luskin 1987)—should be
8Elections to legislatures in countries that use single-member district elections would also pro-
duce substantial opportunities for the strategic environment to differ in the same election; see e.g.
Duch and Palmer (2002) and Gschwend (2001).
9Thebattleground states identifiedbyCNNwere: Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Illinois,
Iowa, Louisiana,Maine,Michigan,Missouri, Nevada,NewHampshire,NewMexico, Ohio, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Washington, West Virginia, andWisconsin. A more scholarly assessment
by McKee (2002) conducted after the election, based on the internal strategy of the Gore and Bush
campaigns, identifies 17 battleground states, excluding Arizona, Illinois, and Nevada from the
states identified by CNN.
10The distinction between “battleground” and “non-battleground” states is somewhat artificial;
in truth, there is a continuum of competitiveness among states, from very competitive (for example,
Florida in 2000) and non-competitive (The District of Columbia, in every election since its residents
received representation in the Electoral College due to the 25th Amendment). However, the alloca-
tion of resources by presidential campaigns appears to follow this simplistic classification scheme
very closely; see e.g. Shaw (1999).
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able to distinguish between an opportunity for expressing a sincere preference and
a situation in which it is important to vote strategically to reduce the possibility of
a less-preferred candidate taking office.
6.3 An Aggregate Analysis of the 1992–2000 Elections
The first test of this theory in the 1992, 1996 and 2000 elections is at the aggregate
level: did more sincere voting for third-party candidates take place in states where
the contest between the major parties was less competitive?
Electoral returns from Presidential Elections, 1789–2000 (2002) and Leip (2003)
were used to estimate a simple regression model:11
votes received by others
total valid votes cast
= α + β1
|Republican votes −Democratic votes|
Republican votes +Democratic votes
+
β2(Partisanship) + β3(Independence) + 
The dependent variable is the percentage of the vote received by third-party can-
didates in the state. The first term on the right is the marginality of the election,
the plurality divided by the number of votes cast for the two candidates receiv-
ing the most votes. The second and third terms are the historic partisanship
(percentage of Republican identifiers subtracted from Democratic identifiers) and
independence (percentage of self-identified independents) among the state elec-
torates from 1992–2001, derived from CBS/New York Times public opinion polls
as compiled by Brown (2003) following the methodology established by Wright,
11For more sophisticated forecasting models of elections in the states, see Campbell (1992) and
Rosenstone (1983).
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Erikson andMcIver (1987). All of these variables were expressed as proportions in
the range 0–1.
We would expect that, if voters took account of the institutional context when
deciding whether or not to vote strategically, the incidence of third-party voting
would be lower in states where the major-party candidates are running close. We
would also expect the incidence of minor party support to be proportional to the
state’s historic level of independent identifiers. In 1992 and 1996, we would expect
a positive relationship between the partisanship variable and the level of minor
party voting in the state, as Ross Perot’s candidacy was generally more attractive
to traditional supporters of the Republican Party than to Democrats. However,
in 2000, as the most popular third-party candidate (Ralph Nader) was expected
to be more attractive to Democratic partisans than Republicans, we would expect
a negative relationship between the partisanship variable and the level of minor
party voting in the state.
The results of this model for the three elections are shown in Table 18.12 In
1992, the results suggest that relatively few voters incorporated strategic consider-
ations into their vote choice; while the coefficient for marginality is in the expected
direction—suggesting that voters were more likely to support a third-party candi-
date in states where the race between George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton was not
competitive—the effect does not reach conventional levels of statistical significance
with a two-tailed test. As expected, Republican-leaning states were more likely
to have higher levels of third-party support (p(t) < .001, two-tailed test), as were
12As the minimum reasonable value of the dependent variable is zero, a tobit model (Tobin 1958)
was also estimated for each election; the results of that model were essentially identical to the
ordinary least squares estimates.
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states with higher numbers of independent identifiers (p < .01). This dynamic
suggests that many third-party voters genuinely believed that Ross Perot had a
non-negligible chance of winning the election and that his campaign’s efforts to
negate beliefs that a vote for Perot was “wasted” were a least somewhat effective.
The results for the 1996 election show clear effects of marginality; third-party
support was significantly higher (p < .001) in states where the race between major-
party candidates Bill Clinton and Bob Dole was not very competitive. As in 1992,
third-party candidates generally attracted greater support in more Republican
states (p < .001)—perhaps in part as a result of many Republicans’ dissatisfaction
with their party’s nominee (Dole). While support for third-party candidates im-
proved in states with more independent identifiers, the effect was only marginally
significant in the 1996 election (p < .097).
The results in 2000 indicate the effect of marginality, while fairly small, it is
significant and in the expected direction (p < .005). As expected, states with high
proportions of independent identifiers had significantly higher levels of voting for
minor party candidates (p < .001); somewhat unexpectedly, minor party voting
was also proportional to the relative strength of the Republican party in the state,
although this effect is not significant.13
In summary, the aggregate evidence suggests that voters reacted to the strategic
environment in the 1996 and 2000 presidential elections, but did not do so in 1992.
However, due to the ecological inference problem (King 1997), we cannot simply
assume that individuals made a conscious choice to vote strategically in closer
13It is possible that, because more strongly Republican states tended also to be less competitive
in this particular election, Democratic identifiers in those states felt more free to vote for Nader as
their votes were less likely to be pivotal.
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Independent Coefficients (Standard Error)
Variable 1992 1996 2000
0.101 0.175*** 0.053**
Marginality of election in state (0.062) (0.041) (0.018)
0.390*** 0.203*** 0.038
Partisanship of state electorate (0.063) (0.049) (0.024)
0.399** 0.172† 0.243***
Independence of state electorate (0.119) (0.101) (0.051)
0.070† 0.033 −0.046*
Intercept (0.040) (0.033) (0.018)
Adjusted R2 0.457 0.363 0.361
F(3, 47) 15.01*** 10.49*** 10.43***
• Coefficients are ordinary least squares linear regression estimates. N = 51.
• The dependent variable is the proportion of the vote received by third-party and independent
candidates in the state or District of Columbia.
• *** indicates p(t) < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; † p < .10 (two-tailed test).
Table 18: Aggregate-level analysis of third-party voting in the 1992, 1996, and 2000
presidential elections.
states and vote sincerely in others. Thus an individual-level model of candidate
choice should also be examined.
6.4 Hypotheses
Anumber of general hypotheses about the voting behavior of individual voters are
suggested by the literature. Fundamentally, respondents who are more strongly
attached to a major political party or a major-party candidate should never vote
strategically in a general election; partisans should have a candidate available from
their party, with rare exceptions, and will be disposed to vote for them.
Among those who favor a minor-party candidate (or a minor party in general),
however, the decision calculus is more complex: if the election between the major
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1. White southerners andwhite born-again Christians should bemore likely to support
Republican candidates.
2. Blackvoters shouldbemore likely thannon-blacks to supportDemocratic candidates.
3. Voters in union households should be more likely than those in non-union house-
holds to support Democrats.
4. Female voters should be more likely than male voters to favor major-party candi-
dates, and Democrats in particular.
5. Older and more educated voters should be more likely to support major-party nom-
inees.
6. Strong partisans should be more likely to support their own parties’ nominees, and
less likely to support the opposite major-party nominee than a third-party candidate.
7. Voters in “battleground” states should be more likely to support major-party nomi-
nees than voters in non-battleground states.
8. Voters who have greater affinity towardminor-party nominees should bemore likely
to support them over major-party candidates.
9. More sophisticated voters should be more likely to vote for minor-party candidates
in non-battleground states than in battleground states, particularly as their affinity
for minor-party candidates increases.
Table 19: Hypotheses tested in the models of strategic voting.
party candidates is close, per Downs supporters of a minor-party candidate should
defect from that candidate and vote strategically for less-objectionable major-party
candidate. However, if the election is not close, minor-party supporters should
continue to favor the minor-party nominee, as the probability of their vote making
a difference in the general election is virtually zero. In other words, we should
expect conditional strategic behavior on the part of voters, where the behavior is
conditioned on their ability to recognize whether or not a sincere vote would be a
“wasted” one.
This discussion assumes that the voter is rational and has sufficient information
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to decide whether to vote strategically. Yet many voters are uninformed or misin-
formed. Hence we would expect more sophisticated voters to be more conscious
of the need to make a choice to vote strategically in a close election. This effect
should be particularly pronounced among voters who favor policies advocated
by the minor-party nominee and, to a lesser extent, by the less-objectionable ma-
jor party nominee. The hypotheses tested in the models, including the “control”
hypotheses, are shown in Table 19.
6.5 Data and Methods
To test these hypotheses, mass survey data collected from a random cross-section
of the United States electorate by the American National Election Studies (ANES)
project in 1992, 1996, and 2000 was used (Rosenstone et al. 1999a,c; and Burns
et al. 2002); each survey consisted of separate pre-election and post-election waves
conducted using a combination of telephone and face-to-face interviews. As none
of these surveys included a direct measure of strategic voting behavior, the vote
choice reported by the respondent in the post-electionwavewas used as the depen-
dent variable.14 In order to simplify the analysis, only voters who reported a vote
for a major-party nominee or the leading independent candidate were included in
the analysis.15
For each election, anumberof independent variableswere included in themodel
to control for known demographic influences on vote choice, including whether
14The use of post-election data, instead of vote intentions expressed before the election, is amatter
of some debate in the literature; seeWright (1990); Gronke (1992); andWright (1992) for a discussion
of the issues, centered on reported voting in House elections.
15Specifically, each election was modelled as a three-way choice: Bush, Clinton, or Perot in 1992;
Clinton, Dole, or Perot in 1996; Bush, Gore, or Nader in 2000.
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the respondent was female, African-American, or a white southerner; whether
the respondent was a self-identified white born-again Christian;16 whether the re-
spondent was married; the age, level of education, and household income of the
respondent; andwhether or not anyone in the respondent’s householdwas amem-
ber of a labor union. The respondent’s party identification was also included,17 as
was the respondent’s level of political sophistication and a “feeling thermometer”
rating of the leading third-party candidate (Perot in 1992 and 1996; Nader in 2000).
The measure of political sophistication was taken from the interviewer’s evalua-
tion of the respondent’s level of political knowledge at the end of the pre-election
interview (for a discussion of the validity of this measure, see Zaller 1992: 333–
39). A “battleground” variable was coded 1 for respondents interviewed in states
that were considered to be battleground states for either of the two major-party
candidates in that election year, as classified by Shaw (1999) for the 1992 and 1996
presidential elections and by McKee (2002), with guidance from Shaw, for 2000.18
In the 1996 and 2000 elections, a measure of policy interest in the outcome of
the election was included: for 2000, as both Gore and Nader were known for their
advocacy of environmental causes, the respondent’s evaluation of the importance
of environmental issues was used to measure this policy interest; we would expect
16See, e.g. Wilcox and Rozell (1997) and Green, Rozell and Wilcox (2003).
17To ease interpretation of the results and to avoid including polynomial or collinear terms,
the party identification scale was split into two scales: strength of Republican identification, and
strength ofDemocratic identification. Respondentswho identified as independentswere coded zero
on both scales; all other respondents were coded on the appropriate scale based on their strength
of identification (1–3) and coded zero on the other scale; for example, a “weak Democrat” would
be coded 2 on the Democratic scale and 0 on the Republican scale, while an “Republican-leaning
independent” would be coded 0 on the Democratic scale and 1 on the Republican scale.
18McKee’s classifications were similar to those produced by CNN (2000); however, I chose to use
McKee’s to improve comparability between elections, and because the CNN data were unavailable
for 1992 and 1996.
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Variable 1992 1996 2000
Vote choice V925612 V961082 V001249
Respondent’s gender V924201 V960066 V001029
Respondent’s race V924202 V960067 V001006A
Where respondent grew up V924125 V960711 V001014
Marital status V923904 V960606 V000909
Born-again Christian V923847 V960601 V000903
Respondent’s age V923903 V960605 V000908
Level of education V923908 V960610 V000913
Union household V924101 V960698 V000990
Household income V924104 V960701 V000994
Party identification V923634 V960420 V000523
Pol. sophistication V924205 V960070 V001033
Cand. feeling thermometer V923307 V960274 V000363
Table 20: Correspondence between common includedvariables andANESvariable
numbers.
respondents with higher levels of knowledge and higher interest in the environ-
ment to favor Gore, who would be more likely to be in a position to promote
pro-environment causes fromwithin the government (due to Nader’s slim chances
at election), while less knowledgeable voterswith interest in the environmentmight
favor Nader and not be thinking strategically. In 1996, a “deficit concern” measure
was constructed from the respondent’s responses to four questions on trade-offs
between taxes, spending, and deficit reduction.19 Asummary of the variables taken
from the 1992, 1996, and 2000 studies are listed in Table 20, and the coding of the
variables included in the models are indicated in Table 21.
As the dependent variable indicates a choice among three, unordered options,
19Attempts to find or construct a suitable “policy interest”measure for the 1992 electionwithin the
1992 ANES data set proved fruitless; shockingly, respondents were not asked any questions about
their personal attitudes toward the budget deficit, although they were asked to identify whether
they blamed the president or Congress more for its size. A series of questions were asked of panel
participants in 1990, some of whom carried over into the 1992 ANES, but this would have excluded
over 1000 respondents from the 1992 survey.
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Variable Description
White southerner Coded 1 for self-identified white respondents
who grew up in the South (ANES state/country
codes 141–159); 0 otherwise.
Black Coded 1 for self-identified black respondents; 0
otherwise.
Female Coded 1 for female; 0 for males.
Married Coded 1 for married respondents; 0 for all
others.
White born-again Christian Coded 1 for white respondents who consider
themselves “born-again” Christians; 0 for
everyone else (including non-Christians).
Age Respondent’s age in years.
Education Seven-point scale indicating respondent’s level
of education (range: 1–7).
Union household Coded 1 for respondents who reported a union
member in their household; 0 otherwise.
Household income Respondent’s household’s income category
(range 1–24 in 1992 and 1996; 1–22 in 2000).
Party identification strength See text.
Battleground See text.
Candidate feeling thermometer Respondent’s evaluation of the candidate on a
101-point scale (range: 0–100).
Political sophistication Interviewer’s evaluation of the respondent’s
level of political information. 5-point scale,
reversed (range: 0–4).
Deficit spending (1996) Responses to trade-off questions between
deficit reduction and budget changes; higher
levels indicate greater support for measures to
reduce the deficit. Five-point scale constructed
from V961219, V961221, V961227, and V961228
(range: 0–4).
Environmental importance (2000) How important the respondent considers
environmental issues, from V000777 (range:
1–5).
Table 21: Coding of variables in models
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estimators such as ordinary least squares or binary or ordinal logit/probit are in-
appropriate. Instead, the multinomial logit estimator was used.20 The models
were estimated in GNU R 1.8.0 with the vglm (vector generalized linear model)
procedure using the multinomial link in the VGAM package (Yee and Wild 1996).
6.6 Results
The results of the analyses are presented in Tables 22–24. For each election year,
coefficient estimates for the logged odds-ratio of selecting each of the major party
nominees versus the third-party candidate are presented, which allow us not only
to see whether or not strategic behavior took place, but also to see which major-
party candidates were affected by that behavior. Positive coefficients indicate a
higher level of the independent variable increases the odds of choosing the given
major-party candidate, while negative coefficients indicate increases in the inde-
pendent variable increase the relative odds of selecting the minor-party candidate.
The model’s predictions of the behavior of “typical” independent-identifying male
voters are shown graphically in Figures 11–13. In each of these figures, the inde-
pendent variable is the hypothetical respondent’s feeling thermometer evaluation
of the third-party candidate, while the dependent variable is the predicted proba-
bility of the respondent voting for that candidate. Each figure includes four panels,
corresponding to the level of sophistication of the hypothetical voter illustrated; in
each panel, the predicted behavior of a voter in a battleground state is compared
to that of a voter in a non-battleground state.21
20For a detailed discussion of the possible estimators for unordered responses, and their strengths
and weaknesses, please see page 69.
21In each panel, the other variables are set to their means in that year’s ANES (for continuous or
ordinal variables) or the modal category. Both partisan identification variables are set to zero (“true
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Independent Coefficient (Std. Err)
Variable log(Bush/Perot) log(Clinton/Perot)
(Intercept) −3.503† −0.972
(2.058) (2.020)
White southerner 0.603* 0.117
(0.239) (0.243)
Black 0.944 2.150***
(0.655) (0.549)
Female 0.533** 0.444*
(0.187) (0.181)
Married 0.174 −0.307
(0.208) (0.200)
White, born-again 0.165 −0.636**
(0.202) (0.221)
Age 0.014* 0.013*
(0.006) (0.006)
Education 0.164* 0.166*
(0.066) (0.066)
Union household 0.023 −0.119
(0.236) (0.223)
Household income −0.009 −0.026
(0.020) (0.019)
Democratic ID strength −0.252† 0.743***
(0.132) (0.102)
Republican ID strength 0.697*** −0.477***
(0.104) (0.131)
Battleground 1.982 0.910
(1.505) (1.482)
Sophistication 1.719* 1.125
(0.762) (0.748)
Perot feeling thermometer 0.028 −0.020
(0.035) (0.034)
Battleground × Soph. −0.987† −0.606
(0.552) (0.547)
Battleground × Perot FT −0.034 −0.002
(0.027) (0.025)
Soph. × Perot FT −0.035** −0.014
(0.013) (0.013)
Battleground × Soph. × Perot 0.020* 0.008
(0.010) (0.009)
Log likelihood (L) −911.698
Wald test versus intercept-only model χ2(38) 1589.854***
Percent correctly classified 75.99%
Proportional reduction in error 54.34%
• Coefficients are multinomial logit maximum-likelihood estimates. N = 1445
• *** indicates Pr(t) < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, † p < .10 (two-tailed test).
Table 22: Results of the 1992 individual-level model.
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Independent Coefficient (Std. Err)
Variable log(Clinton/Perot) log(Dole/Perot)
(Intercept) 4.536* 1.275
(2.174) (2.257)
White southerner −0.327 −0.171
(0.400) (0.403)
Black 3.110* 0.187
(1.205) (1.581)
Female 0.682* 0.227
(0.323) (0.331)
Married −1.346** −1.132**
(0.420) (0.431)
White, born-again −0.210 0.563
(0.374) (0.366)
Age 0.023* 0.038***
(0.011) (0.011)
Education 0.125 0.152
(0.119) (0.119)
Union household 0.277 −0.512
(0.385) (0.398)
Household income 0.086* 0.127***
(0.035) (0.037)
Democratic ID strength 0.954*** −0.346
(0.195) (0.228)
Republican ID strength 0.112 0.966***
(0.224) (0.212)
Sophistication −0.801 −0.391
(0.754) (0.762)
Battleground 0.975 1.374
(3.440) (3.460)
Perot feeling thermometer −0.103*** −0.083**
(0.030) (0.030)
Soph. × Battleground −0.906 −1.013
(1.138) (1.144)
Battleground × Perot FT −0.027 −0.018
(0.060) (0.060)
Soph. × Perot FT 0.010 0.008
(0.011) (0.011)
Soph. × Battleground × Perot FT 0.019 0.015
(0.020) (0.020)
Deficit attitudes −0.429 −0.096
(0.364) (0.389)
Deficit × Soph. 0.095 −0.015
(0.143) (0.151)
Log likelihood (L) −414.251
Wald test versus intercept-only model χ2(42) 1164.152***
Percent correctly classified 84.08%
Proportional reduction in error 65.68%
• Coefficients are multinomial logit maximum-likelihood estimates. N = 942
Table 23: Results of the 1996 individual-level model.
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Independent Coefficient (Std. Err)
Variable log(Gore/Nader) log(Bush/Nader)
(Intercept) 4.443 4.123
(4.966) (5.069)
White southerner −0.133 0.164
(0.824) (0.814)
Black −0.467 −0.702
(1.177) (1.284)
Female 0.694 0.448
(0.528) (0.535)
Married −0.475 −0.301
(0.574) (0.583)
White, born-again −0.574 0.373
(0.628) (0.617)
Age 0.046* 0.037†
(0.020) (0.020)
Education 0.071 −0.138
(0.186) (0.189)
Union household −0.362 −0.527
(0.639) (0.657)
Household income 0.080 0.091
(0.078) (0.078)
Democratic ID strength 1.941*** 0.409
(0.420) (0.437)
Republican ID strength 0.250 1.392***
(0.404) (0.387)
Sophistication −1.035 −0.015
(1.615) (1.644)
Battleground 16.399† 16.002†
(9.486) (9.551)
Nader feeling thermometer −0.008 −0.049
(0.046) (0.047)
Soph. × Battleground −4.501 −4.517
(2.789) (2.808)
Battleground × Nader FT −0.258* −0.223†
(0.125) (0.127)
Soph. × Nader FT −0.017 −0.009
(0.015) (0.015)
Soph. × Battleground × Nader FT 0.072† 0.064†
(0.037) (0.038)
Environmental importance scale −1.356 −0.371
(0.992) (0.980)
Env. import × Soph. 0.492 0.123
(0.307) (0.300)
Log likelihood (L) −263.733
Wald test versus intercept-only model χ2(42) 1321.553***
Percent correctly classified 88.15%
Proportional reduction in error 75.58%
• Coefficients are multinomial logit maximum-likelihood estimates. N = 793
Table 24: Results of the 2000 individual-level model.
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The results in 1992 strongly support the hypothesis that strategic behavior was
conditional on both the electoral environment and the voter’s ability to recognize
that environment. Figure 11 illustrates the interaction between sophistication, the
respondent’s affinity for Perot, and whether or not the state was a “battleground”
state. For less sophisticated voters (in the “Below Average Sophistication” pane
of the graph), the effect of the strategic environment is minimal: there is a simple,
direct relationship between affinity for Perot and the voter’s odds of choosing to
vote for him over Bush or Clinton. However, among more sophisticated voters,
we see a significantly “flatter” relationship in battleground states than in non-
battleground states, suggesting that more sophisticated voters were attuned to the
possibility of “wasting” their votes in more competitive states. An examination
of the coefficients underlying these effects suggests that for voters in 1992, the
strategic choice was primarily between Perot and Bush, indicating that Perot’s
support among independent voters was largely due to disaffection with Bush.
The demographic and other control variables in 1992 suggest that female, older
and better-educated voters were significantly more likely to favor one of themajor-
party nominees over Perot. White southerners were significantly more likely than
non-black northerners (the reference category) to favor Bush over Perot. African-
Americans were significantly more likely to favor Clinton over Perot—hardly a
surprise, given Perot’s disastrous appearance before the NAACP in July of 1992,
which precipitated his brief exit from the race—while white born-again Christians
were more likely to favor Perot over Clinton. As we might expect, stronger parti-
sans (“in-partisans”) were more likely than independents to support their party’s
nominee over Perot, while “out-partisans” were less likely to do so.
independent”).
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Feeling thermometer rating for Perot, 1992
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Figure 11: Predicted probabilities of an independent voter casting a ballot for Ross
Perot in 1992.
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Feeling thermometer rating for Perot, 1996
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Figure 12: Predicted probabilities of an independent voter casting a ballot for Ross
Perot in 1996.
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Feeling thermometer rating for Nader, 2000
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Figure 13: Predicted probabilities of an independent voter casting a ballot for Ralph
Nader in 2000.
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The conditional strategic behavior hypothesis, however, fares poorly in 1996.
While the graphical evidence in Figure 12 suggests that the most sophisticated vot-
ers did engage in strategic behavior in battleground states, none of the interactions
are statistically significant. Instead,we see a fairly clear, direct relationship between
support for Perot and the respondents’ odds of choosing him over Clinton or Dole.
The lack of evidence for conditional strategic behavior may simply indicate that
most voters, on the basis of media coverage and polling data, concluded that the
race between Clinton and Dole was so lopsided that most voters in “battleground”
states did not actually believe the disposition of their state’s electors would affect
the national outcome.
As in 1992, older voters were significantly more likely than younger voters to
prefer both major-party nominees, as were voters with higher household incomes.
Also like 1992, black voters were significantly more likely to prefer Clinton over
Perot; female voters were also more likely to prefer Clinton over Perot. Unlike in
the previous election, however, white southerners and born-again Christians were
no more likely to prefer Perot over the Republican nominee. The partisan effects in
1996 were similar for “in-partisans”; however, “out-partisans” were no more likely
to prefer Perot over the opposite party’s nominee than independents, suggesting
Perot’s cross-over appeal had diminished by 1996.
In the 2000 election, the conditional strategic behavior hypothesis performs
fairly well.22 Surprisingly, the effects indicate that Nader attracted strategic behav-
ior relative to both candidates (the 1992 results only showed conditional strategic
22Due to the significantly smaller 2000 ANES sample, and the small (but consistent with overall
returns) number of respondents who reported voting for Nader, the 2000 results should be viewed
with some degree of caution.
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choice between George H.W. Bush and Perot), and are illustrated graphically in
Figure 13. The results suggest that among less sophisticated voters, support for
Nader was generally low (except among voters who rated Nader very high on the
feeling thermometer scale); by contrast, in the “Very High Sophistication” panel
we see conditional strategic behavior: the voters who rate Nader the highest on
the feeling thermometer are less likely to vote for him in battleground states than
in non-battleground states. Unlike in earlier elections, the control variables per-
form rather poorly; as in 1992 and 1996, older voters are more likely to support a
major-party nominee than Nader, and we see the familiar “in-partisan” effects.
6.7 Conclusions
In this chapter, I have advanced a theory of conditional strategic behavior—that voters
decide between casting a strategic or sincere ballot based on their perception of the
electoral environment. Voters with higher levels of political knowledge are more
likely to perceive the electoral environment—whether or not an election will be
close—correctly, anddemonstrate higher levels ofDownsian rational behavior. The
results of an analysis using the 1992, 1996, and 2000 American National Election
Studies suggest that conditional strategic behavior took place in at least 1992 and
2000; while the 1996 results do not suggest this behavior took place, it may simply
be due to the national electoral environment in that year being uncompetitive due
to a moderately popular incumbent president seeking re-election against a weak
opposition-party nominee.
One avenue for future research would be to broaden the analysis to use an
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indicator of competitiveness that is more nuanced than the “battleground”–“non-
battleground” dichotomy, using indicators such as poll results as used in typical
forecastingmodels (e.g. Rosenstone 1983 and Campbell 1992) or perhapsmeasures
of campaign spending in particular states Shaw (1999). This type of analysis would
perhaps improve our understanding of the effects of campaign expenditures and
the psychological impact of poll results on vote choice. Other potential measures
would include the respondent’s estimate of the closeness of the election in his or
her state, or the actual marginality of the election in the particular state.23
As Duch and Palmer (2002) show, differences in strategic behavior within the
electorate are not unique to U.S. presidential contests; they demonstrate that more
sophisticated voters, when presentedwith hypothetical electoral environments, se-
lect between sincere and strategic choices—they behave with Downsian rationality
when the electoral environment requires a strategic choice (in the Hungarian case,
when their preferred party’s candidate has a negligible chance of reaching a run-off
round), but will cast sincere ballots when the overall outcome is not in question.
This effect should be observable in any context where the voting system allows for
strategic behavior to be preferable to a sincere choice.24
The idea of conditional strategic behavior is also related to the interest in the
American context in whether or not voters prefer divided or unified government,
and whether voters act on that preference when casting their ballots—what Smith
23The closeness question, alas, was only asked about the national result in the 2000 ANES.
24Arrow (1970) argues that all electoral systems that include choices between more than two
options cannot be “ideal”; this is known as “Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem.” All electoral rules
appear to fail this “idealness” test by permitting strategic behavior of some form or another.
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et al. (1999) term “nonseparable preferences.” Specifically, voters may have non-
separable preferences—for example, they may prefer a Democratic-controlled ex-
ecutive and a Republican-controlled legislature—but be in an electoral situation
where a strategic vote to accomplish that end is meaningless, as one election is
(or both elections are) non-competitive. In these circumstances, while it might be
rational to cast a ballot consistent with these preferences, a sincere vote on other
grounds is possible—either for the major-party candidate who is likely to win, or a
minor-party candidate. Thus survey and other evidence showing thatmany voters’
choices aren’t consistent with “cognitive Madisonianism” may be the result of the
lack of competitiveness of many districts and states. This might be a worthwhile
area for further research.
It would also be desirable to follow-up this researchwith data collected to better
understand the nature of voting for minor-party candidates. The present ANES,
with its limited sample size, relative lack of interest in minor-party candidates,
and lack of questions on strategic motivations, is insufficient for the deeper under-
standing that research on the strategic motivations of voters requires in the future.
Fielding of survey-experiment hybrids in the United States, like the Hungarian
example used by Duch and Palmer (2002), might improve our ability to find the
determinants of who votes strategically and why.
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSIONS
This dissertation has examined the decision-making processes of voters of vary-
ing levels of sophistication when making evaluations of candidates, parties, and
policies, and making choices among candidates and parties in elections. Each
chapter generally supports a conclusion that more sophisticated voters make their
decisions in different ways: they generally draw on more information and show a
greater understanding of the electoral context.
In Chapter 4, I demonstrate that voters with higher levels of political sophisti-
cation are more likely to use the so-called “likability heuristic” proposed by Brady
and Sniderman (1985) when making evaluations in 1994 of the Clinton Adminis-
tration’s performance on the health care reform issue and establishing their own
positions on whether private organizations or the government should be responsi-
ble for financing health care. This effect is particularly pronouncedwhen voters are
called upon to evaluate the general issue of government versus private provision
of health care services, with only more sophisticated voters making use of their
evaluations of former first lady Hillary Rodham Clinton as a guide for deciding
their own position on the issue.
I show in Chapter 5 that more politically sophisticated voters are better able to
make retrospective evaluations of the performance of the 1994–98 “Purple Coali-
tion” in the Netherlands, and are more likely to draw on those evaluations of
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coalition performance in making their vote choice. In particular, I find that the less
sophisticated portions of the Dutch public are more likely to use their attitudes
toward the Christian Democrats, a party that was not a member of the coalition, to
make evaluations of the coalition’s performance, which leads them to make poten-
tially “incorrect” voting decisions. I also show that an item-response theory model
of political sophistication, based on political knowledge items, is an effective sur-
rogate for the interviewer evaluation of political information used in the American
National Election Studies series.
InChapter 6, I show that voterswith higher levels of political expertise are better
able to “correctly” identify opportunities for sincere voting in the 1992, 1996, and
2000U.S. presidential elections, based on the anticipated closeness of the election in
the state in which they reside. More sophisticated voters are less likely to support a
minor-party candidate when they reside in a state where the election is expected to
be close, while the vote choices of less sophisticated voters tend to only be affected
by their affinity for minor-party candidates.
7.1 Refining the measurement of sophistication
There are a number of directions for future research that are suggested by this dis-
sertation. A significant contribution of this dissertation has to been to reintroduce
the use of item-response theory models for the measurement of political exper-
tise. Given Zaller (1985)’s conclusion that the interviewer evaluation of political
information was a reliable measure of sophistication, and the oft-noted resistance
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of respondents to “quiz”-type questions about politics1, why would we want to
abandon that simple measure in favor of a more complex measure that would take
away from time needed for other, perhaps more interesting questions?
In the case of the analysis inChapter 5, the answer is fairly obvious: therewas no
interviewer evaluation that could be used. There were a number of summary mea-
sures based on respondents’ recorded responses that may have been used instead,
but they omitted potentially valuable information about respondent knowledge
and were based on relatively dated scaling methods. Other established surveys
may not have direct measures like the interviewer evaluation, but may contain
questions that would be sufficient for constructing a valid measure of political
sophistication.
In other future surveys, theremay be no opportunity to collect interviewer eval-
uations. The deployment of surveys and survey-based experiments by computer
has become more widespread, and the evidence suggests they would appear to be
a low-cost and reliable way of obtaining data for original political research from
mass publics (Berrens et al. 2003); however, this mode of interview, by definition,
omits the interviewer. The only availablemeasure of political sophisticationwould
have to be derived from the respondent’s answers to the questions asked in the
survey, thus necessitating some form of scale construction—either an IRT model,
or a more simplistic approach.
The use of IRT models also permits us to test whether particular conceptions
of political sophistication perform better than others. For example, in the IRT
1However, Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996) argue that, in practice, this is not a serious problem
(295–96).
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model in Chapter 5, a set of “differentiation” measures based on those proposed
by Luskin (1990) performed as well as the best pure “knowledge” taken directly
from the survey, based on the estimated discrimination and difficulty parameters
of the items from the model. This finding suggests that both “raw” knowledge
and the ability to conceptualize relationships among political actors based on that
knowledge are meaningful components of sophistication—indicating that Luskin
1990 is correct to call for more nuanced measurement of political sophistication
than simple knowledge batteries.
7.2 The impact of low sophistication on democracy
The findings of this dissertation would appear to support the legions of studies,
from the original Columbia (Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee 1954) and Michigan
(Campbell et al. 1960) studies throughmoremodern treatments like those of Bartels
(1996, 2003), Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996), Lupia and McCubbins (1998), and
Luskin (2002a), that suggest that voters both are woefully under-informed and
make choices that are inconsistent with their true, “fully-informed” preferences. If
that is the case, what are the possible responses?
Popkin (1991) argues that voters ordinarily possess limited information, and
that this is simply a fact of life that cannot be remedied. Both ambivalence and
voters’ use of information shortcuts—or heuristics—are “inescapable fact[s] of life,
and will occur no matter how educated we are, how much information we have,
and how much thinking we do” (218). Rather than treating low knowledge as a
problem to be solved, Popkin believes political campaigns, such as the presidential
primary process in the United States, should be redesigned to accommodate the
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inevitability of voters’ ambivalence and limited information.
Taking a somewhat different tack, Marcus, Neumann andMacKuen (2000) sug-
gest that instead of voters’ decision-making ability being consistent over time, it
varies over time due to changes in the electoral environment: voters become more
attuned to politics when issues that are personally important to them are being
debated, but less attuned when those issues are no longer in the forefront. They
characterize this behavior by voters as reflecting “affective intelligence.” Their find-
ings suggest that traditional measures of sophistication underestimate the latent
political expertise of many voters.
On the other hand, both Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996) and Lupia andMcCub-
bins (1998) argue that voters’ lack of basic political knowledge is a hindrance to the
democratic process. Both sets of authors suggest institutional reforms to correct
this deficiency. Lupia andMcCubbins suggest that institutions should be designed
to maximize the number of cues available to the electorate that will enable them
to make reasoned choices—for example, the abolition of non-partisan elections,
public funding of campaigns, and term limits, encouraging public deliberation on
issues, and the provision of greater amounts of political information by parties
and interest groups (205–27). Delli Carpini and Keeter suggest the public would
benefit from wider availability of news media; higher levels of general and civic
education;2 more widespread attention to, and publicity for, elite debates (similar,
perhaps, to the “Larry King Live” debate on NAFTA between Ross Perot and Al
Gore in 1994); fostering civic virtues in the citizenry; and increased concern about
2However, it is noteworthy that political sophistication and civic engagement appear to have
declined over time, despite higher levels of education among the electorate and greater attention to
formal civic education in secondary and post-secondary schools; see e.g. Putnam (2001).
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the low level of knowledge of the public by political scientists (272–90).
It is also possible that what matters isn’t what voters know about politics, but
rather what they understand about politics. Knowledge may simply be a byprod-
uct of understanding among those citizens most exposed to political information;
in other words, knowledge is only important to the extent that higher levels of
knowledge about politics—as measured by, for example, answers to the notorious
“trivia questions” about politics that are regularly used by civic groups as evidence
that the public has insufficient levels of civic education—generally reflect greater
understanding of politics. If that is the case, civic education efforts may improve
voters’ reasoning processes even if they don’t lead to greater retention of the minu-
tiae of politics by citizens over the long term. This possibility may suggest that
more indirect measures of political sophistication, like Luskin (1990)’s “differentia-
tion” measure, may better tap the concept of sophistication than direct knowledge
items.3
While this dissertation does not provide any direct support for any of these
prescriptions, it does suggest that there are meaningful—and perhaps more per-
vasive than previously thought—differences in the decision-making processes of
citizens that are explained by differences in political expertise. Obviously, if we
expect citizens to be purely rational actors, many are incapable ofmeeting that stan-
dard; this dissertation suggests that even common heuristics and readily-available
knowledge—such as whether or not they are being bombarded by television ads
in a presidential contest—do not help many voters to act “as if” they are fully
informed, either.
3It may also be desirable to test whether civic education efforts, including typical political science
“survey” courses for undergraduates, have a lasting effect on the political sophistication of citizens.
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On the other hand, the desirability of a society in which political issues are
so critically important that they require the attentiveness of large segments of the
public seems relatively low; consider highly polarized societies like contemporary
Israel and Venezuela, where it is unlikely there are any voters without opinions
on the Palestinian peace process or on the soft-authoritarian Cha´vez regime, re-
spectively, where the outcome of elections is literally a question of life or death in
many voters’ minds. Perhaps we should count our blessings that the most salient
mainstream debates in the United States today are over the future of entitlement
programs for the elderly, the level of restriction that will be placed on abortion, and
where and under what conditions same-sex relationships will be acknowledged
by the government—and that our pluralist system permits voters to focus their
interests on particular policies that directly interest them. This suggests that rather
than creating institutions that might lead to a more conflicted or polarized society,
the interest of democracy would be best served by giving citizens the tools to par-
ticipate in public debate, but leaving it up to them whether their participation is
strictly necessary.
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